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Single Idea 6094

[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique ]

Full Idea

It is quite clear that propositions are not what you might call 'real'; if you were making an inventory of the world, propositions would not come in.

Clarification

An 'inventory' is a catalogue

Gist of Idea

An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions

Source

Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §III)

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'Russell's Logical Atomism', ed/tr. Pears,David [Fontana 1972], p.70


A Reaction

I am not clear why this is "quite clear". Propositions might even turn up in our ontology as physical objects (brain states). He says beliefs are real, but if you can't have a belief without a proposition, and they aren't real, you are in trouble.


The 32 ideas from 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism'

Not only atomic truths, but also general and negative truths, have truth-makers [Russell, by Rami]
Treat description using quantifiers, and treat proper names as descriptions [Russell, by McCullogh]
Russell's new logical atomist was of particulars, universals and facts (not platonic propositions) [Russell, by Linsky,B]
Russell's atomic facts are actually compounds, and his true logical atoms are sense data [Russell, by Quine]
Modern trope theory tries, like logical atomism, to reduce things to elementary states [Russell, by Ellis]
Russell asserts atomic, existential, negative and general facts [Russell, by Armstrong]
'Existence' means that a propositional function is sometimes true [Russell]
Russell uses 'propositional function' to refer to both predicates and to attributes [Quine on Russell]
In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts' [Russell, by Quine]
Propositions don't name facts, because each fact corresponds to a proposition and its negation [Russell]
Logical atomism aims at logical atoms as the last residue of analysis [Russell]
Facts make propositions true or false, and are expressed by whole sentences [Russell]
In a logically perfect language, there will be just one word for every simple object [Russell]
The names in a logically perfect language would be private, and could not be shared [Russell]
An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions [Russell]
The business of metaphysics is to describe the world [Russell]
I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods [Russell]
The theory of error seems to need the existence of the non-existent [Russell]
Perception goes straight to the fact, and not through the proposition [Russell]
Modal terms are properties of propositional functions, not of propositions [Russell]
Once you have enumerated all the atomic facts, there is a further fact that those are all the facts [Russell]
Romulus does not occur in the proposition 'Romulus did not exist' [Russell]
You can understand 'author of Waverley', but to understand 'Scott' you must know who it applies to [Russell]
You can discuss 'God exists', so 'God' is a description, not a name [Russell]
Normally a class with only one member is a problem, because the class and the member are identical [Russell]
Reducing entities and premisses makes error less likely [Russell]
Logical atoms aims to get down to ultimate simples, with their own unique reality [Russell]
Numbers are classes of classes, and hence fictions of fictions [Russell]
There are a set of criteria for pinning down a logically proper name [Russell, by Sainsbury]
A name has got to name something or it is not a name [Russell]
I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday [Russell]
You can't name all the facts, so they are not real, but are what propositions assert [Russell]