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Single Idea 9010

[filed under theme 19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique ]

Full Idea

Why not just talk of sentences and equivalence and let the propositions go? Propositions have been projected as shadows of sentences, but at best they will give us nothing the sentences will not give.

Gist of Idea

We can abandon propositions, and just talk of sentences and equivalence

Source

Willard Quine (Philosophy of Logic [1970], Ch.1)

Book Ref

Quine,Willard: 'Philosophy of Logic' [Prentice-Hall 1970], p.10


A Reaction

I don't understand how you decide that two sentences are equivalent. 'There's someone in that wood'; 'yes, there's a person amongst those trees'. Identical truth-conditions. We can formulate a non-linguistic fact about those truth-conditions.


The 15 ideas with the same theme [rejection of the existence of propositions]:

An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions [Russell]
I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods [Russell]
I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday [Russell]
The main aim of the multiple relations theory of judgement was to dispense with propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B]
In 1906, Russell decided that propositions did not, after all, exist [Russell, by Monk]
There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle]
If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle]
Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer]
It makes no sense to say that two sentences express the same proposition [Quine]
There is no rule for separating the information from other features of sentences [Quine]
We can abandon propositions, and just talk of sentences and equivalence [Quine]
The problem with propositions is their individuation. When do two sentences express one proposition? [Quine]
Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson]
Indexicals reveal big problems with the traditional idea of a proposition [Perry]
If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe]