more on this theme
|
more from this text
Single Idea 3103
[filed under theme 18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
]
Full Idea
It has been argued (e.g. by Tyler Burge) that certain relations to other language users are determinants of content.
Gist of Idea
Maybe content involves relations to a language community
Source
Gabriel M.A. Segal (A Slim Book about Narrow Content [2000], 1.4)
Book Ref
Segal,Gabriel M.A.: 'A Slim Book about Narrow Content' [MIT 2000], p.10
A Reaction
Burge's idea (with Wittgenstein behind him) strikes me as plausible (more plausible than water and elms determining the content). Our concepts actually shift during conversations.
The
18 ideas
from Gabriel M.A. Segal
|
3103
|
Maybe content involves relations to a language community
[Segal]
|
|
3104
|
Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them?
[Segal]
|
|
3105
|
Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary?
[Segal]
|
|
3106
|
If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious
[Segal]
|
|
3108
|
If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ
[Segal]
|
|
3109
|
If content is external, so are beliefs and desires
[Segal]
|
|
3110
|
Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible
[Segal]
|
|
3113
|
The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth
[Segal]
|
|
3112
|
Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions
[Segal]
|
|
3111
|
Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference
[Segal]
|
|
3116
|
Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users
[Segal]
|
|
3117
|
Concepts can survive a big change in extension
[Segal]
|
|
3118
|
If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things
[Segal]
|
|
3119
|
Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms
[Segal]
|
|
3121
|
If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts
[Segal]
|
|
3123
|
Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints
[Segal]
|
|
3124
|
Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds
[Segal]
|
|
3125
|
Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality
[Segal]
|