more on this theme     |     more from this thinker

Single Idea 3974

[filed under theme 18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content ]

Full Idea

What we mean by what we say is partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant.

Gist of Idea

Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant

Source

Donald Davidson (Davidson on himself [1994], p.235)

Book Ref

'A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind', ed/tr. Guttenplan,Samuel [Blackwell 1995], p.235

A Reaction

There is 'strict and literal meaning', which is fixed by the words, even if I don't know what I am saying. But 'speaker's meaning' is surely a pure matter of a state of mind?

The 15 ideas from 'Davidson on himself'

3960 There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson]
3964 If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson]
3965 Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson]
3961 Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson]
3963 There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson]
3966 The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson]
3962 Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson]
3969 There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson]
3967 Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson]
3968 Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson]
3970 Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson]
3971 There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson]
3972 Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson]
3973 Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson]
3974 Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson]