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Single Idea 3997
[filed under theme 18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
]
Full Idea
There is nothing to support the thesis that wide content is the only kind of content, or that it is any way pre-eminent or basic.
Clarification
'Wide' content is meaning which depends on how the world is, not on a mental state
Gist of Idea
Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority
Source
David Lewis (Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself) [1994], p.424)
Book Ref
'A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind', ed/tr. Guttenplan,Samuel [Blackwell 1995], p.424
A Reaction
The idea that all content is 'wide' seems quite wrong. We can't all be wrong about the meaning of a word, because the underlying facts have not yet been discovered.
The
39 ideas
with the same theme
[meanings aren't in the head ('Externalism')]:
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12995
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The name 'gold' means what we know of gold, and also further facts about it which only others know
[Leibniz]
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12807
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The word 'gold' means a hidden constitution known to experts, and not just its appearances
[Leibniz]
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7531
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We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert
[Russell]
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7055
|
Externalist accounts of mental content begin in Wittgenstein
[Wittgenstein, by Heil]
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4138
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Is white simple, or does it consist of the colours of the rainbow?
[Wittgenstein]
|
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9168
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I can't distinguish elm trees, but I mean by 'elm' the same set of trees as everybody else
[Putnam]
|
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5820
|
'Water' has an unnoticed indexical component, referring to stuff around here
[Putnam]
|
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7612
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Reference is social not individual, because we defer to experts when referring to elm trees
[Putnam]
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8872
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It is widely supposed that externalism cannot be reconciled with first-person authority
[Davidson]
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8874
|
It is hard to interpret a speaker's actions if we take a broad view of the content
[Davidson]
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6175
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External identification doesn't mean external location, as with sunburn
[Davidson, by Rowlands]
|
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3974
|
Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant
[Davidson]
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3464
|
There is no such thing as 'wide content'
[Searle]
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3416
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Content may match several things in the environment
[Kim]
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3418
|
'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful
[Kim]
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3421
|
Content is best thought of as truth conditions
[Kim]
|
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16428
|
Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract
[Stalnaker]
|
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16474
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How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know?
[Stalnaker]
|
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3998
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If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs
[Lewis]
|
|
3997
|
Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority
[Lewis]
|
|
3999
|
A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs
[Lewis]
|
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4000
|
Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things
[Lewis]
|
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2441
|
Truth conditions require a broad concept of content
[Fodor]
|
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3982
|
How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties?
[Fodor]
|
|
7884
|
Most reductive accounts of representation imply broad content
[Papineau]
|
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7863
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If content hinges on matters outside of you, how can it causally influence your actions?
[Papineau]
|
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8248
|
Phenomenology says thought is part of the world
[Deleuze/Guattari]
|
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3207
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Simple externalism is that the meaning just is the object
[Rey]
|
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4067
|
Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought
[Crane]
|
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7058
|
Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological
[Heil]
|
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4922
|
Consciousness involves interaction with persons and the world, as well as brain functions
[Edelman/Tononi]
|
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3758
|
Semantic externalism ties content to the world, reducing error
[Bernecker/Dretske]
|
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3104
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Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them?
[Segal]
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3103
|
Maybe content involves relations to a language community
[Segal]
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3109
|
If content is external, so are beliefs and desires
[Segal]
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3111
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Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference
[Segal]
|
|
3116
|
Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users
[Segal]
|
|
3117
|
Concepts can survive a big change in extension
[Segal]
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19300
|
The molecules may explain the water, but they are not what 'water' means
[Hale]
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