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Single Idea 3382

[filed under theme 18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / c. Turing Test ]

Full Idea

The Turing test is too tough, because something doesn't have to be smart enough to outwit a human (or even have language) to have mentality or intelligence.

Gist of Idea

A machine with a mind might still fail the Turing Test

Source

Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p. 97)

Book Ref

Kim,Jaegwon: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Westview 1998], p.97

A Reaction

Presumably an alien with an IQ of 580 would also fail the Turing test. Indeed people of normal ability, but from a very different culture, might also fail. However, most of us would pass it.

The 67 ideas from 'Philosophy of Mind'

3359 Cartesian dualism fails because it can't explain mental causation [Kim]
3360 Are pains pure qualia, or do they motivate? [Kim]
3362 Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible [Kim]
3363 We often can't decide what emotion, or even sensation, we are experiencing [Kim]
3366 Pain has no reference or content [Kim]
3365 Intentionality involves both reference and content [Kim]
3367 Both thought and language have intentionality [Kim]
3368 Mind is basically qualities and intentionality, but how do they connect? [Kim]
3369 Logical behaviourism translates mental language to behavioural [Kim]
3370 What behaviour goes with mathematical beliefs? [Kim]
3371 Behaviour depends on lots of mental states together [Kim]
3372 Behaviour is determined by society as well as mental states [Kim]
3373 Snakes have different pain behaviour from us [Kim]
3374 Token physicalism isn't reductive; it just says all mental events have some physical properties [Kim]
3375 If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange? [Kim]
3376 We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties [Kim]
3377 Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation [Kim]
3379 Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable [Kim]
3380 Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation? [Kim]
3382 A machine with a mind might still fail the Turing Test [Kim]
3383 The Turing Test is too specifically human in its requirements [Kim]
3384 The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese [Kim]
3387 A culture without our folk psychology would be quite baffling [Kim]
3386 Folk psychology has been remarkably durable [Kim]
3388 Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't [Kim]
3389 Inverted qualia and zombies suggest experience isn't just functional [Kim]
3391 Crosswiring would show that pain and its function are separate [Kim, by PG]
3390 Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas? [Kim]
3392 Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers [Kim]
3393 How do functional states give rise to mental causation? [Kim]
3394 Maybe folk psychology is a simulation, not a theory [Kim]
3397 Beliefs cause other beliefs [Kim]
3396 Experiment requires mental causation [Kim]
3399 If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness [Kim]
3401 A common view is that causal connections must be instances of a law [Kim]
3403 We assume people believe the obvious logical consequences of their known beliefs [Kim]
3402 If someone says "I do and don't like x", we don't assume a contradiction [Kim]
3406 Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds [Kim, by PG]
3407 Laws are either 'strict', or they involve a 'ceteris paribus' clause [Kim]
3408 Two identical brain states could have different contents in different worlds [Kim]
3409 Mental substance causation makes physics incomplete [Kim]
3410 Folk psychology has adapted to Freudianism [Kim]
3412 How do we distinguish our anger from embarrassment? [Kim]
3411 How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another? [Kim]
3413 Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience [Kim]
3414 What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible? [Kim]
3416 Content may match several things in the environment [Kim]
3417 Content depends on other content as well as the facts [Kim]
3418 'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful [Kim]
3419 Pain, our own existence, and negative existentials, are not external [Kim]
3421 Content is best thought of as truth conditions [Kim]
3420 Two types of water are irrelevant to accounts of behaviour [Kim]
3422 Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence [Kim]
3424 Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists [Kim]
3426 If one theory is reduced to another, we make fewer independent assumptions about the world [Kim]
3427 Reductionism is impossible if there aren't any 'bridge laws' between mental and physical [Kim]
3428 Behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour via bridging principles [Kim]
3430 Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property [Kim]
3431 Supervenience suggest dependence without reduction (e.g. beauty) [Kim]
3432 Is weight a 'resultant' property of water, but transparency an 'emergent' property? [Kim]
3434 Emergent properties are 'brute facts' (inexplicable), but still cause things [Kim]
3433 The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain [Kim]
3436 Should properties be individuated by their causal powers? [Kim]
3437 'Physical facts determine all the facts' is the physicalists' slogan [Kim]
3438 Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level [Kim]
3439 Reductionism gets stuck with qualia [Kim]
3440 Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling [Kim]