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Single Idea 5890

[filed under theme 23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion ]

Full Idea

We ought not to share distresses ourselves for the sake of others, but we ought to relieve others of their distress if we can.

Gist of Idea

We should not share the distress of others, but simply try to relieve it

Source

M. Tullius Cicero (Tusculan Disputations [c.44 BCE], IV.xxvi.56)

Book Ref

Cicero: 'Tusculan Disputations', ed/tr. King,J.E. [Harvard Loeb 1927], p.391


A Reaction

This strikes me as a sensible and balanced attitude. Some people, particularly in a Christian culture, urge that feeling strong and painful compassion for others is an intrinsic good, but the commonsense view is that that just increases human suffering.


The 20 ideas with the same theme [sympathetic concern for others' pain]:

The young feel pity from philanthropy, but the old from self-concern [Aristotle]
We should not share the distress of others, but simply try to relieve it [Cicero]
Epictetus says we should console others for misfortune, but not be moved by pity [Epictetus, by Taylor,C]
If someone is weeping, you should sympathise and help, but not share his suffering [Epictetus]
A person unmoved by either reason or pity to help others is rightly called 'inhuman' [Spinoza]
Pity is a bad and useless thing, as it is a pain, and rational people perform good deeds without it [Spinoza]
People who live according to reason should avoid pity [Spinoza]
Pity is not a virtue, but at least it shows a desire to live uprightly [Spinoza]
The fact that we weep (e.g. in theatres) shows that we are naturally compassionate [Rousseau]
Generosity and pity are vices, because they falsely imply one person's superiority to another [Kant, by Berlin]
In ancient Rome pity was considered neither good nor bad [Nietzsche]
The overcoming of pity I count among the noble virtues [Nietzsche]
You cannot advocate joyful wisdom while rejecting pity, because the two are complementary [Scruton on Nietzsche]
Plato, Spinoza and Kant are very different, but united in their low estimation of pity [Nietzsche]
Pity consoles those who suffer, because they see that they still have the power to hurt [Nietzsche]
Apart from philosophers, most people rightly have a low estimate of pity [Nietzsche]
Invalids are parasites [Nietzsche]
Compassion is unreliable, because it favours people close to us [Nussbaum]
Awareness of others' suffering doesn't create an obligation to help [Kekes]
Sympathy can undermine the moral order just as much as crime does [Scruton]