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Single Idea 20029

[filed under theme 20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes ]

Full Idea

Most causalists allow that reason explanations are teleological, but say that such purposive explanations are analysable causally, where the primary reasons for the act are the guiding causes of the act.

Gist of Idea

Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause

Source

Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 3)

Book Ref

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.11

A Reaction

The authors observe that it is hard to adjudicate on this matter, and that the concept of the 'cause' of an action is unclear.

The 22 ideas with the same theme [reasons have a distinct causal role in actions]:

5267 Our reasoned acts are held to be voluntary and our own doing [Aristotle]
20042 We assign the cause of someone's walking when we say why they are doing it [Aristotle]
21363 Motivation is causality seen from within [Schopenhauer]
19615 I want to suppress in myself the normal reasons people have for action [Cioran]
23436 It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring [Foot]
23734 The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M]
23737 Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson]
20075 Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R]
6664 Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe]
3395 Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim]
19698 Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed [Davidson, by Neta]
9284 Reasons are 'internal' if they give a person a motive to act, but 'external' otherwise [Williams,B]
3871 Explaining an action is showing that it is rational [Newton-Smith]
20064 Actions are not mere effects of reasons, but are under their control [Audi,R]
6662 We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice [Lowe]
19519 Rational decisions are either taken to be based on evidence, or to be explained causally [Conee/Feldman]
20060 Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R]
20055 A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R]
20056 In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R]
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
18684 Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]