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Single Idea 9269

[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility ]

Full Idea

It is not true that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if his will was free when he did it. He may be morally responsible for having done it even though his will was not free at all.

Gist of Idea

A person may be morally responsible without free will

Source

Harry G. Frankfurt (Freedom of the Will and concept of a person [1971], §IV)

Book Ref

'Free Will', ed/tr. Watson,Gary [OUP 1982], p.93

A Reaction

Frankfurt seems to be one of the first to assert this break with the traditional view. Good for him. I take moral responsibility to hinge on an action being caused by a person, but not with a mystical view of what a person is.

The 23 ideas from Harry G. Frankfurt

20015 Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall]
9264 Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt]
9265 The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt]
9266 A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt]
9270 A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt]
9267 Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt]
9269 A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt]
9232 It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance [Frankfurt]
9233 Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt]
9234 If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything [Frankfurt]
9227 We might not choose a very moral life, if the character or constitution was deficient [Frankfurt]
9228 Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important [Frankfurt]
9229 What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt]
9230 People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained [Frankfurt]
9231 Freedom needs autonomy (rather than causal independence) - embracing our own desires and choices [Frankfurt]
9240 Love creates a necessity concerning what to care about [Frankfurt]
9241 Loving oneself is not a failing, but is essential to a successful life [Frankfurt]
9235 Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them [Frankfurt]
9237 The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants [Frankfurt]
9236 Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object [Frankfurt]
9238 Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality [Frankfurt]
9239 I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake [Frankfurt]
9300 Boredom is serious, not just uncomfortable; it threatens our psychic survival [Frankfurt]