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Single Idea 4751

[filed under theme 3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth ]

Full Idea

We could compare the status of 'true' with the status of the logical operator 'and' in logic. Once we have explained how it functions to conjoin two propositions, there is not much more to be said about it.

Gist of Idea

Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic

Source

Pascal Engel (Truth [2002], §2.4)

Book Ref

Engel,Pascal: 'Truth' [Acumen 2002], p.50

A Reaction

A good statement of the minimalist view. I don't believe it, because I don't believe that truth is confined to language. An uneasy feeling I can't put into words can turn out to be true. Truth is a relational feature of mental states.

The 16 ideas from 'Truth'

4739 In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition [Engel]
4737 Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances? [Engel]
4738 The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers [Engel]
4744 We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel]
4745 Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel]
4746 Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth [Engel]
4750 The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel]
4751 Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel]
4752 Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p') [Engel]
4754 Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires [Engel]
4753 Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel]
4755 Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel]
4759 Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel]
4762 The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires [Engel]
4764 We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs [Engel]
4763 'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence [Engel]