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Full Idea
Of presentations, some are graspable, some non-graspable. The graspable presentation, which they say is the criterion of facts [pragmata], is that which comes from an existing object and is stamped and molded in accordance wth the existing object itself.
Gist of Idea
Graspable presentations are criteria of facts, and are molded according to their objects
Source
report of Chrysippus (fragments/reports [c.240 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.46
Book Ref
'The Stoics Reader', ed/tr. Inwood,B/Gerson,L.P. [Hackett 2008], p.12
A Reaction
[in lost Physics Bk 2] The big modern anguish over truth-as-correspondence is how you are supposed to verify the 'accordance'. This idea seems to blur the ideas of truth and justification (the 'criterion'), and you can't have both as accordance.
Related Idea
Idea 20793 How could you ever know that the presentation is similar to the object? [Sext.Empiricus on Chrysippus]
| 20780 | Graspable presentations are criteria of facts, and are molded according to their objects [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 23483 | Proposition elements correlate with objects, but the whole picture does not correspond to a fact [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
| 13985 | A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle] |
| 10843 | Facts aren't exactly true statements, but they are what those statements say [Strawson,P] |
| 10842 | The fact which is stated by a true sentence is not something in the world [Strawson,P] |
| 13469 | Tarski showed how we could have a correspondence theory of truth, without using 'facts' [Hart,WD] |
| 10355 | Facts can't make claims true, because they are true claims [Brandom, by Kusch] |
| 8315 | Maybe facts are just true propositions [Lowe] |
| 18359 | One proposition can be made true by many different facts [David] |
| 18357 | What makes a disjunction true is simpler than the disjunctive fact it names [David] |
| 4750 | The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel] |
| 15333 | Modern correspondence is said to be with the facts, not with true propositions [Horsten] |
| 17740 | Instead of correspondence of proposition to fact, look at correspondence of its parts [Jenkins] |