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Single Idea 3593
[filed under theme 3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
]
Full Idea
The trouble with appeal to facts in the correspondence theory is that, in general, we have no way of indicating what fact a sentence, when true, corresponds to other than asserting the sentence.
Gist of Idea
The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence
Source
Michael Williams (Problems of Knowledge [2001], Ch.12)
Book Ref
Williams,Michael: 'Problems of Knowledge' [OUP 2001], p.140
The
29 ideas
from 'Problems of Knowledge'
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3566
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We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire
[Williams,M]
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3564
|
Is it people who are justified, or propositions?
[Williams,M]
|
|
3565
|
Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable
[Williams,M]
|
|
3573
|
Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions
[Williams,M]
|
|
3571
|
Externalism does not require knowing that you know
[Williams,M]
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3567
|
How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts?
[Williams,M]
|
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3569
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In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief
[Williams,M]
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3574
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Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge
[Williams,M]
|
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3575
|
Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity
[Williams,M]
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|
3576
|
Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security
[Williams,M]
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3577
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Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs
[Williams,M]
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3580
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Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations
[Williams,M]
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3578
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Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences?
[Williams,M]
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3579
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Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world
[Williams,M]
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3582
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Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible
[Williams,M]
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3581
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Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional
[Williams,M]
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3584
|
Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence
[Williams,M]
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3585
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Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict
[Williams,M]
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3587
|
Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory
[Williams,M]
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3586
|
Only a belief can justify a belief
[Williams,M]
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|
3588
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Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences
[Williams,M]
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3589
|
Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected?
[Williams,M]
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3590
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Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself
[Williams,M]
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3591
|
We could never pin down how many beliefs we have
[Williams,M]
|
|
3593
|
The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence
[Williams,M]
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|
3592
|
Phenomenalism is a form of idealism
[Williams,M]
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3595
|
What works always takes precedence over theories
[Williams,M]
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|
3594
|
Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things
[Williams,M]
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3599
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Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe
[Williams,M]
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