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Single Idea 15334

[filed under theme 3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique ]

Full Idea

The coherence theory seems too liberal. It seems there can be more than one systematic whole which, while being internally coherent, contradict each other, and thus cannot all be true. Coherence is a necessary but not sufficient condition for truth.

Gist of Idea

The coherence theory allows multiple coherent wholes, which could contradict one another

Source

Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 02.1)

Book Ref

Horsten,Leon: 'The Tarskian Turn' [MIT 2011], p.13

A Reaction

This is a modern post-Tarski axiomatic truth theorist making very short work indeed of the coherence theory of truth. I take Horsten to be correct.

The 50 ideas from Leon Horsten

10881 The concept of 'ordinal number' is set-theoretic, not arithmetical [Horsten]
10882 Predicative definitions only refer to entities outside the defined collection [Horsten]
10884 A theory is 'categorical' if it has just one model up to isomorphism [Horsten]
10885 Computer proofs don't provide explanations [Horsten]
15324 Semantic theories of truth seek models; axiomatic (syntactic) theories seek logical principles [Horsten]
15323 Truth is a property, because the truth predicate has an extension [Horsten]
15325 Inferential deflationism says truth has no essence because no unrestricted logic governs the concept [Horsten]
15329 Nonclassical may accept T/F but deny applicability, or it may deny just T or F as well [Horsten]
15326 Doubt is thrown on classical logic by the way it so easily produces the liar paradox [Horsten]
15328 A theory is 'non-conservative' if it facilitates new mathematical proofs [Horsten]
15330 Friedman-Sheard theory keeps classical logic and aims for maximum strength [Horsten]
15331 Kripke-Feferman has truth gaps, instead of classical logic, and aims for maximum strength [Horsten]
15332 'Reflexive' truth theories allow iterations (it is T that it is T that p) [Horsten]
15334 The coherence theory allows multiple coherent wholes, which could contradict one another [Horsten]
15333 Modern correspondence is said to be with the facts, not with true propositions [Horsten]
15337 The correspondence 'theory' is too vague - about both 'correspondence' and 'facts' [Horsten]
15336 The pragmatic theory of truth is relative; useful for group A can be useless for group B [Horsten]
15338 We may believe in atomic facts, but surely not complex disjunctive ones? [Horsten]
15340 Tarski Bi-conditional: if you'll assert φ you'll assert φ-is-true - and also vice versa [Horsten]
15341 Deduction Theorem: ψ only derivable from φ iff φ→ψ are axioms [Horsten]
15344 Deflationism skips definitions and models, and offers just accounts of basic laws of truth [Horsten]
15345 Semantic theories have a regress problem in describing truth in the languages for the models [Horsten]
15346 Axiomatic approaches to truth avoid the regress problem of semantic theories [Horsten]
15348 Propositions have sentence-like structures, so it matters little which bears the truth [Horsten]
15347 A theory of syntax can be based on Peano arithmetic, thanks to the translation by Gödel coding [Horsten]
15349 It is easier to imagine truth-value gaps (for the Liar, say) than for truth-value gluts (both T and F) [Horsten]
15350 The Naďve Theory takes the bi-conditionals as axioms, but it is inconsistent, and allows the Liar [Horsten]
15351 Axiomatic theories take truth as primitive, and propose some laws of truth as axioms [Horsten]
15352 A definition should allow the defined term to be eliminated [Horsten]
15353 The first incompleteness theorem means that consistency does not entail soundness [Horsten]
15354 Tarski's hierarchy lacks uniform truth, and depends on contingent factors [Horsten]
15355 Strengthened Liar: 'this sentence is not true in any context' - in no context can this be evaluated [Horsten]
15356 Deflationism concerns the nature and role of truth, but not its laws [Horsten]
15358 Deflationism says truth isn't a topic on its own - it just concerns what is true [Horsten]
15357 Philosophy is the most general intellectual discipline [Horsten]
15359 Deflation: instead of asserting a sentence, we can treat it as an object with the truth-property [Horsten]
15360 ZFC showed that the concept of set is mathematical, not logical, because of its existence claims [Horsten]
15361 A good theory of truth must be compositional (as well as deriving biconditionals) [Horsten]
15362 If 'Italy is large' lacks truth, so must 'Italy is not large'; but classical logic says it's large or it isn't [Horsten]
15363 In the supervaluationist account, disjunctions are not determined by their disjuncts [Horsten]
15364 English expressions are denumerably infinite, but reals are nondenumerable, so many are unnameable [Horsten]
15366 Satisfaction is a primitive notion, and very liable to semantical paradoxes [Horsten]
15367 By adding truth to Peano Arithmetic we increase its power, so truth has mathematical content! [Horsten]
15368 This deflationary account says truth has a role in generality, and in inference [Horsten]
15369 Set theory is substantial over first-order arithmetic, because it enables new proofs [Horsten]
15370 Predicativism says mathematical definitions must not include the thing being defined [Horsten]
15371 An axiomatic theory needs to be of maximal strength, while being natural and sound [Horsten]
15372 Some claim that indicative conditionals are believed by people, even though they are not actually held true [Horsten]
15373 Axiomatic approaches avoid limiting definitions to avoid the truth predicate, and limited sizes of models [Horsten]
15374 Truth has no 'nature', but we should try to describe its behaviour in inferences [Horsten]