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Single Idea 15607

[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts ]

Full Idea

There is a saying that, when we have grasped a concept, we still do not know what to think with it. But there is nothing to be thought with a concept save the concept itself.

Gist of Idea

We don't think with concepts - we think the concepts

Source

Georg W.F.Hegel (Logic (Encyclopedia I) [1817], §03 Rem)

Book Ref

Hegel,Georg W.F.: 'The Hegel Reader', ed/tr. Houlgate,Stephen [Blackwell 1998], p.135


A Reaction

Analytic philosophers should read Hegel on concepts, because he approaches the matter so very differently, and seems to be the root of the continental approach to such things. He seems to me to talk more sense than Frege on the subject.


The 28 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about concepts]:

Concepts are intellectual phantasms [Stoic school, by Ps-Plutarch]
Concepts are what unite a proposition [Leibniz]
Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind [Kant]
Either experience creates concepts, or concepts make experience possible [Kant]
Reason generates no concepts, but frees them from their link to experience in the understanding [Kant]
We don't think with concepts - we think the concepts [Hegel]
Active thought about objects produces the universal, which is what is true and essential of it [Hegel]
Every concept depends on the counter-concepts of what it is not [Hegel, by Bowie]
Infinities expand the bounds of the conceivable; we explore concepts to explore conceivability [Cantor, by Friend]
Concepts are rough groups of simultaneous sensations [Nietzsche]
Concepts don’t match one thing, but many things a little bit [Nietzsche]
Early Frege takes the extensions of concepts for granted [Frege, by Dummett]
A universal of which we are aware is called a 'concept' [Russell]
The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans]
The logical attitude tries to turn concepts into functions, when they are really forms or forces [Deleuze/Guattari]
'Sortal' concepts show kinds, use indefinite articles, and require grasping identities [Wright,C]
A concept is only a sortal if it gives genuine identity [Wright,C]
A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist [Lowe]
Our experience may be conceptual, but surely not the world itself? [Kusch]
Corresponding to every concept there is a class (some of them sets) [George/Velleman]
The main theories of concepts are exemplar, prototype and knowledge [Murphy]
Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents) [Recanati]
Concepts can be presented extensionally (as objects) or intensionally (as a characterization) [Friend]
For pragmatists a concept means its consequences [Macbeth]
Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence]
Concepts for categorisation and for induction may be quite different [Machery]
Concept theories aim at their knowledge, processes, format, acquisition, and location [Machery]
We should abandon 'concept', and just use 'prototype', 'exemplar' and 'theory' [Machery]