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Single Idea 6021
[filed under theme 3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
]
Full Idea
It is only when we say a proposition that we speak truly or falsely.
Gist of Idea
It is only when we say a proposition that we speak truly or falsely
Source
Sextus Empiricus (Against the Professors (six books) [c.180], 8.74)
Book Ref
'The Hellenistic Philosophers:Vol.1 translations', ed/tr. Long,A. /Sedley,D. [CUP 1987], p.203
A Reaction
This makes assertions truth-bearers, rather than propositions. But a proposition can be true or false if it is stamped with a date and/or place. "Shakespeare was born in Stratford on 23rd April 1664". No one needs to assert that.
The
25 ideas
with the same theme
[sorts of items capable of truth and falsehood]:
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20823
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The truth bearers are said to be the signified, or the signifier, or the meaning of the signifier
[Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus]
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6021
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It is only when we say a proposition that we speak truly or falsely
[Sext.Empiricus]
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12522
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It is propositions which are true or false, though it is sometimes said of ideas
[Locke]
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12523
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If they refer to real substances, 'man' is a true idea and 'centaur' a false one
[Locke]
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12558
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Truth only belongs to mental or verbal propositions
[Locke]
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19389
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Truth is a characteristic of possible thoughts
[Leibniz]
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19388
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True and false seem to pertain to thoughts, yet unthought propositions seem to be true or false
[Leibniz]
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5644
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In Hegel's logic it is concepts (rather than judgements or propositions) which are true or false
[Hegel, by Scruton]
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8187
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Frege was strongly in favour of taking truth to attach to propositions
[Frege, by Dummett]
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6442
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Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences
[Russell]
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5784
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In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs
[Russell]
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14102
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What is true or false is not mental, and is best called 'propositions'
[Russell]
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5419
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Truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements
[Russell]
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17652
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Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved
[Goodman]
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3745
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Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth?
[O'Connor]
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8188
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Davidson takes truth to attach to individual sentences
[Davidson, by Dummett]
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13942
|
Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons
[Cartwright,R]
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13941
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Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements?
[Cartwright,R]
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10845
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To be true a sentence must express a proposition, and not be ambiguous or vague or just expressive
[Lewis]
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2435
|
Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving
[Fodor]
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18369
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There are at least fourteen candidates for truth-bearers
[Kirkham]
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18996
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A statement S is 'partly true' if it has some wholly true parts
[Yablo]
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21616
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Truth and falsity apply to suppositions as well as to assertions
[Williamson]
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4737
|
Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances?
[Engel]
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15348
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Propositions have sentence-like structures, so it matters little which bears the truth
[Horsten]
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