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Single Idea 20832

[filed under theme 10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility ]

Full Idea

The Master Argument: these conflict 1) what is past and true is necessary, 2) the impossible does not follow from the possible, 3) something possible neither is nor will be true. Hence only that which is or will be true is possible.

Gist of Idea

The Master Argument seems to prove that only what will happen is possible

Source

report of Diodorus Cronus (fragments/reports [c.300 BCE]) by Epictetus - The Discourses 2.19.1

Book Ref

'The Stoics Reader', ed/tr. Inwood,B/Gerson,L.P. [Hackett 2008], p.102


A Reaction

[Epictetus goes on to discuss views about which of the three should be given up] It is possible there will be a sea fight tomorrow; tomorrow comes, and no sea fight; so there was necessarily no sea fight; so the impossible followed from the possible.


The 41 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about what is possible]:

Possibility is when the necessity of the contrary is false [Aristotle]
Anything which is possible either exists or will come into existence [Aristotle]
The actual must be possible, because it occurred [Aristotle]
The Master Argument seems to prove that only what will happen is possible [Diod.Cronus, by Epictetus]
A proposition is possible if it is true when nothing stops it being true [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
In future, only logical limits can be placed on divine omnipotence [Anon (Par), by Boulter]
There is a reason why not every possible thing exists [Leibniz]
How can things be incompatible, if all positive terms seem to be compatible? [Leibniz]
Is the possible greater than the actual, and the actual greater than the necessary? [Kant]
A concept is logically possible if non-contradictory (but may not be actually possible) [Kant]
The analytic mark of possibility is that it does not generate a contradiction [Kant]
That a concept is not self-contradictory does not make what it represents possible [Kant]
Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce]
Only the actual exists, so possibilities always reduce to actuality after full analysis [Russell]
What is true used to be possible, but it may no longer be so [Wright,GHv]
Quine wants identity and individuation-conditions for possibilia [Quine, by Lycan]
All possibilities are recombinations of properties in the actual world [Armstrong, by Lewis]
Mathematics eliminates possibility, as being simultaneous actuality in sets [Putnam]
Scientific essentialists say science should define the limits of the possible [Ellis]
Possible difference across worlds depends on difference across time in the actual world [Shoemaker]
Unicorns are vague, so no actual or possible creature could count as a unicorn [Kripke]
The concept of possibility is prior to that of necessity [Bonjour]
There's statistical, logical, nomological, conceptual and metaphysical possibility [Fodor]
What is the truthmaker for a non-existent possible? [Molnar]
Possible states of affairs are not propositions; a proposition can't be a state of affairs! [Fine,K]
When we consider possibilities, there must be something we are considering [Polt]
The metaphysically possible is what acceptable principles and categories will permit [Lowe]
It is impossible to reach a valid false conclusion from true premises, so reason itself depends on possibility [Lowe]
Possibilities can be logical, theoretical, physical, economic or human [Girle]
Sometimes we want to specify in what ways a thing is possible [Melia]
We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher]
States of affairs are only possible if some substance could initiate a causal chain to get there [Jacobs]
Possibility might be non-contradiction, or recombinations of the actual, or truth in possible worlds [Mumford/Anjum]
Since possibilities are properties of the world, calling 'red' the determination of a determinable seems right [Rumfitt]
If two possibilities can't share a determiner, they are incompatible [Rumfitt]
Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter]
Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter]
Early modern possibility is what occurs sometime; for Leibniz, it is what is not contradictory [Arthur,R]
All possibility is anchored in the potentiality of individual objects [Vetter]
Possibility is a generalised abstraction from the potentiality of its bearer [Vetter]
Possibilities are potentialities of actual things, but abstracted from their location [Vetter]