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Single Idea 14027

[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis ]

Full Idea

It is necessary that we look to the primary conception corresponding to each word and that it stand in no need of demonstration, if, that is, we are going to have something to which we can refer the object of search or puzzlement and opinion.

Gist of Idea

If we are to use words in enquiry, we need their main, unambiguous and uncontested meanings

Source

Epicurus (Letter to Herodotus [c.293 BCE], 38)

Book Ref

Epicurus: 'The Epicurus Reader', ed/tr. Inwood,B. /Gerson,L. [Hackett 1994], p.6


A Reaction

This either points to definition or to consensus, and since definition seems in danger of some sort of Quinean circularity, I favour consensus. Philosophy is, after all, people discussing things, not inscriptions sent to the gods.


The 38 ideas with the same theme [analysis focusing on formal or ordinary language]:

If we are to use words in enquiry, we need their main, unambiguous and uncontested meanings [Epicurus]
Even philosophers have got bogged down in analysing tiny bits of language [Seneca]
Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists [Sext.Empiricus]
Most scholastic disputes concern words, where agreeing on meanings would settle them [Descartes]
We must be careful to keep words distinct from ideas and images [Spinoza]
The existence of tensed verbs shows that not all truths are necessary truths [Reid]
Thoughts are learnt through words, so language shows the limits and shape of our knowledge [Herder]
Philosophy should not focus on names, but on the determined nature of things [Feuerbach]
Philosophy can't be unbiased if it ignores language, as that is no more independent than individuals are [Kierkegaard]
Grammar only reveals popular metaphysics [Nietzsche]
Frege was the first to give linguistic answers to non-linguistic questions [Frege, by Dummett]
Frege initiated linguistic philosophy, studying number through the sense of sentences [Frege, by Dummett]
'Socrates is human' expresses predication, and 'Socrates is a man' expresses identity [Russell]
Common speech is vague; its vocabulary and syntax must be modified, for precision [Russell]
All philosophy should begin with an analysis of propositions [Russell]
The study of grammar is underestimated in philosophy [Russell]
We don't need a theory of truth, because we use the word perfectly well [Wittgenstein]
Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein]
Bring words back from metaphysics to everyday use [Wittgenstein]
All complex statements can be resolved into constituents and descriptions [Wittgenstein]
Our language is an aspect of biology, and so its inner logic is opaque [Wittgenstein]
Most philosophical questions arise from failing to understand the logic of language [Wittgenstein]
The limits of my language means the limits of my world [Wittgenstein]
Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman]
Ordinary language is the beginning of philosophy, but there is much more to it [Austin,JL]
Close examination of actual word usage is the only sure way in philosophy [Strawson,P]
Essentialism says metaphysics can't be done by analysing unreliable language [Ellis]
The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson]
Semantic facts are preferable to transcendental philosophical fiction [Wiggins]
If philosophy is analysis of meaning, available to all competent speakers, what's left for philosophers? [Soames]
There are the 'is' of predication (a function), the 'is' of identity (equals), and the 'is' of existence (quantifier) [Benardete,JA]
If you begin philosophy with language, you find yourself trapped in it [Heil]
Linguistic philosophy approaches problems by attending to actual linguistic usage [Mautner]
Questions about objects are questions about certain non-vacuous singular terms [Hale]
Philosophers are often too fussy about words, dismissing perfectly useful ordinary terms [Rosen]
'Did it for the sake of x' doesn't involve a sake, so how can ontological commitments be inferred? [Macdonald,C]
Analysis rests on natural language, but its ideal is a framework which revises language [Halbach]
Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification [PG]