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Single Idea 21552

[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis ]

Full Idea

I am persuaded that common speech is full of vagueness and inaccuracy, and that any attempt to be precise and accurate requires modification of common speech both as regards vocabulary and as regards syntax.

Gist of Idea

Common speech is vague; its vocabulary and syntax must be modified, for precision

Source

Bertrand Russell (Mr Strawson on Referring [1957], p.123)

Book Ref

Russell,Bertrand: 'Essays in Analysis', ed/tr. Lackey,Douglas [George Braziller 1973], p.123

A Reaction

It is interesting that he cites the syntax of ordinary language, as well as the vocabulary. The implication is that vagueness can also be a feature of syntax (and hence his pursuit of logical form), which is not normally mentioned

The 38 ideas with the same theme [analysis focusing on formal or ordinary language]:

14027 If we are to use words in enquiry, we need their main, unambiguous and uncontested meanings [Epicurus]
13313 Even philosophers have got bogged down in analysing tiny bits of language [Seneca]
22764 Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists [Sext.Empiricus]
24033 Most scholastic disputes concern words, where agreeing on meanings would settle them [Descartes]
17200 We must be careful to keep words distinct from ideas and images [Spinoza]
23657 The existence of tensed verbs shows that not all truths are necessary truths [Reid]
20947 Thoughts are learnt through words, so language shows the limits and shape of our knowledge [Herder]
6918 Philosophy should not focus on names, but on the determined nature of things [Feuerbach]
16012 Philosophy can't be unbiased if it ignores language, as that is no more independent than individuals are [Kierkegaard]
20121 Grammar only reveals popular metaphysics [Nietzsche]
9841 Frege was the first to give linguistic answers to non-linguistic questions [Frege, by Dummett]
9840 Frege initiated linguistic philosophy, studying number through the sense of sentences [Frege, by Dummett]
14456 'Socrates is human' expresses predication, and 'Socrates is a man' expresses identity [Russell]
21552 Common speech is vague; its vocabulary and syntax must be modified, for precision [Russell]
7529 All philosophy should begin with an analysis of propositions [Russell]
14109 The study of grammar is underestimated in philosophy [Russell]
18732 We don't need a theory of truth, because we use the word perfectly well [Wittgenstein]
18274 Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein]
22490 Bring words back from metaphysics to everyday use [Wittgenstein]
6429 All complex statements can be resolved into constituents and descriptions [Wittgenstein]
23492 Our language is an aspect of biology, and so its inner logic is opaque [Wittgenstein]
23510 Most philosophical questions arise from failing to understand the logic of language [Wittgenstein]
2938 The limits of my language means the limits of my world [Wittgenstein]
17651 Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman]
21960 Ordinary language is the beginning of philosophy, but there is much more to it [Austin,JL]
7921 Close examination of actual word usage is the only sure way in philosophy [Strawson,P]
5486 Essentialism says metaphysics can't be done by analysing unreliable language [Ellis]
8349 The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson]
16512 Semantic facts are preferable to transcendental philosophical fiction [Wiggins]
13974 If philosophy is analysis of meaning, available to all competent speakers, what's left for philosophers? [Soames]
3312 There are the 'is' of predication (a function), the 'is' of identity (equals), and the 'is' of existence (quantifier) [Benardete,JA]
7001 If you begin philosophy with language, you find yourself trapped in it [Heil]
6887 Linguistic philosophy approaches problems by attending to actual linguistic usage [Mautner]
10308 Questions about objects are questions about certain non-vacuous singular terms [Hale]
14092 Philosophers are often too fussy about words, dismissing perfectly useful ordinary terms [Rosen]
7923 'Did it for the sake of x' doesn't involve a sake, so how can ontological commitments be inferred? [Macdonald,C]
16325 Analysis rests on natural language, but its ideal is a framework which revises language [Halbach]
4465 Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification [PG]