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Single Idea 14748

[filed under theme 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object ]

Full Idea

What is true of the many is not exactly what is true of the one. After all they are many while it is one. The number of the many is six, whereas the number of the fusion is one. The singletons of the many are distinct from the singleton of the one.

Gist of Idea

The many are many and the one is one, so they can't be identical

Source

David Lewis (Parts of Classes [1991], 3.6)

Book Ref

Lewis,David: 'Parts of Classes' [Blackwell 1991], p.87


A Reaction

I wouldn't take this objection to be conclusive. 'Some pebbles' seem to be many, but a 'handful of pebbles' seem to be one, where the physical situation might be identical. If they are not identical, then the non-identity is purely conceptual.

Related Idea

Idea 14747 'Composition as identity' says that an object just is the objects which compose it [Sider]


The 35 ideas from 'Parts of Classes'

Sets are mereological sums of the singletons of their members [Lewis, by Armstrong]
Set theory reduces to a mereological theory with singletons as the only atoms [Lewis, by MacBride]
Lewis prefers giving up singletons to giving up sums [Lewis, by Fine,K]
Lewis only uses fusions to create unities, but fusions notoriously flatten our distinctions [Oliver/Smiley on Lewis]
We can build set theory on singletons: classes are then fusions of subclasses, membership is the singleton [Lewis]
We can replace the membership relation with the member-singleton relation (plus mereology) [Lewis]
Classes divide into subclasses in many ways, but into members in only one way [Lewis]
A subclass of a subclass is itself a subclass; a member of a member is not in general a member [Lewis]
We can accept the null set, but there is no null class of anything [Lewis]
We have no idea of a third sort of thing, that isn't an individual, a class, or their mixture [Lewis]
There are four main reasons for asserting that there is an empty set [Lewis]
We needn't accept this speck of nothingness, this black hole in the fabric of Reality! [Lewis]
Atomless gunk is an individual whose parts all have further proper parts [Lewis]
Set theory has some unofficial axioms, generalisations about how to understand it [Lewis]
If we don't understand the singleton, then we don't understand classes [Lewis]
If singletons are where their members are, then so are all sets [Lewis]
Some say qualities are parts of things - as repeatable universals, or as particulars [Lewis]
If singleton membership is external, why is an object a member of one rather than another? [Lewis]
In mereology no two things consist of the same atoms [Lewis]
Maybe singletons have a structure, of a thing and a lasso? [Lewis]
A huge part of Reality is only accepted as existing if you have accepted set theory [Lewis]
To be a structuralist, you quantify over relations [Lewis]
A property is any class of possibilia [Lewis]
Giving up classes means giving up successful mathematics because of dubious philosophy [Lewis]
I like plural quantification, but am not convinced of its connection with second-order logic [Lewis]
Existence doesn't come in degrees; once asserted, it can't then be qualified [Lewis]
Trout-turkeys exist, despite lacking cohesion, natural joints and united causal power [Lewis]
Given cats, a fusion of cats adds nothing further to reality [Lewis]
The one has different truths from the many; it is one rather than many, one rather than six [Lewis]
The many are many and the one is one, so they can't be identical [Lewis]
Set theory isn't innocent; it generates infinities from a single thing; but mathematics needs it [Lewis]
Zermelo's model of arithmetic is distinctive because it rests on a primitive of set theory [Lewis]
Plural quantification lacks a complete axiom system [Lewis]
A commitment to cat-fusions is not a further commitment; it is them and they are it [Lewis]
Lewis affirms 'composition as identity' - that an object is no more than its parts [Lewis, by Merricks]