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Single Idea 14748

[filed under theme 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object ]

Full Idea

What is true of the many is not exactly what is true of the one. After all they are many while it is one. The number of the many is six, whereas the number of the fusion is one. The singletons of the many are distinct from the singleton of the one.

Gist of Idea

The many are many and the one is one, so they can't be identical

Source

David Lewis (Parts of Classes [1991], 3.6)

Book Ref

Lewis,David: 'Parts of Classes' [Blackwell 1991], p.87


A Reaction

I wouldn't take this objection to be conclusive. 'Some pebbles' seem to be many, but a 'handful of pebbles' seem to be one, where the physical situation might be identical. If they are not identical, then the non-identity is purely conceptual.

Related Idea

Idea 14747 'Composition as identity' says that an object just is the objects which compose it [Sider]


The 23 ideas with the same theme [objects seen as made up of their parts]:

In Parmenides, if composition is identity, a whole is nothing more than its parts [Plato, by Harte,V]
If one object is divided into its parts, someone can then say that one are many and many is one [Plato]
Is there a house over and above its bricks? [Aristotle]
A mass consists of its atoms, so the addition or removal of one changes its identity [Locke]
Identity is an atemporal relation, but composition is relative to times [Wiggins, by Sider]
The many are many and the one is one, so they can't be identical [Lewis]
Lewis affirms 'composition as identity' - that an object is no more than its parts [Lewis, by Merricks]
Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples [Lewis]
If contact causes composition, do two colliding balls briefly make one object? [Inwagen]
If bricks compose a house, that is at least one thing, but it might be many things [Inwagen]
Why should packed-together particles be a thing (Mt Everest), but not scattered ones? [Benardete,JA]
The identity of composite objects isn't fixed by original composition, because how do you identify the origin? [Lowe]
'Composition as identity' says that an object just is the objects which compose it [Sider]
If a chair could be made of slightly different material, that could lead to big changes [Hale]
'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi]
'Unrestricted composition' says any two things can make up a third thing [Merricks]
Composition as identity is false, as identity is never between a single thing and many things [Merricks]
Composition as identity is false, as it implies that things never change their parts [Merricks]
There is no visible difference between statues, and atoms arranged statuewise [Merricks]
Composition is asymmetric and transitive [Simons]
The idea of composition, that parts of the world are 'made of' something, is no longer helpful [Ladyman/Ross]
Complex particulars are either masses, or composites, or sets [Hossack]
The relation of composition is indispensable to the part-whole relation for individuals [Hossack]