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Single Idea 7685

[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects ]

Full Idea

To be an object is to be a predication subject, and to be this as opposed to that particular object, whether existent or not, is to have a distinctive combination of properties.

Gist of Idea

An object is a predication subject, distinguished by a distinctive combination of properties

Source

Dale Jacquette (Ontology [2002], Ch. 2)

Book Ref

Jacquette,Dale: 'Ontology' [Acumen 2002], p.59


A Reaction

The last part depends on Leibniz's Law. The difficulty is that two objects may only be distinguishable by being in different places, and location doesn't look like a property. Cf. Idea 5055.

Related Idea

Idea 5055 No two things are totally identical [Leibniz]


The 22 ideas from 'Ontology'

Ontology is the same as the conceptual foundations of logic [Jacquette]
Ontology must include the minimum requirements for our semantics [Jacquette]
Logic is based either on separate objects and properties, or objects as combinations of properties [Jacquette]
Reduce states-of-affairs to object-property combinations, and possible worlds to states-of-affairs [Jacquette]
The modal logic of C.I.Lewis was only interpreted by Kripke and Hintikka in the 1960s [Jacquette]
Logic describes inferences between sentences expressing possible properties of objects [Jacquette]
Logic is not just about signs, because it relates to states of affairs, objects, properties and truth-values [Jacquette]
Being is maximal consistency [Jacquette]
An object is a predication subject, distinguished by a distinctive combination of properties [Jacquette]
The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations [Jacquette]
The actual world is a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs [Jacquette]
Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds? [Jacquette]
Existence is completeness and consistency [Jacquette]
On Russell's analysis, the sentence "The winged horse has wings" comes out as false [Jacquette]
Can a Barber shave all and only those persons who do not shave themselves? [Jacquette]
If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either [Jacquette]
We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions [Jacquette]
Numbers, sets and propositions are abstract particulars; properties, qualities and relations are universals [Jacquette]
The extreme views on propositions are Frege's Platonism and Quine's extreme nominalism [Jacquette]
If qualia supervene on intentional states, then intentional states are explanatorily fundamental [Jacquette]
Reduction of intentionality involving nonexistent objects is impossible, as reduction must be to what is actual [Jacquette]
To grasp being, we must say why something exists, and why there is one world [Jacquette]