16971 | Plato says sciences are unified around Forms; Aristotle says they're unified around substance [Aristotle, by Moravcsik] |
19594 | General statements about nature are not valid [Novalis] |
22363 | You have only begun to do real science when you can express it in numbers [Kelvin] |
14766 | Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science [Peirce] |
19225 | I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below [Peirce] |
20270 | There is no one scientific method; we must try many approaches, and many emotions [Nietzsche] |
16882 | The building blocks contain the whole contents of a discipline [Frege] |
14433 | Mathematically expressed propositions are true of the world, but how to interpret them? [Russell] |
18699 | Carnap tried to define all scientific predicates in terms of primitive relations, using type theory [Carnap, by Button] |
21687 | It seems obvious to prefer the simpler of two theories, on grounds of beauty and convenience [Quine] |
21688 | There are four suspicious reasons why we prefer simpler theories [Quine] |
4630 | Two theories can be internally consistent and match all the facts, yet be inconsistent with one another [Quine, by Baggini /Fosl] |
6809 | Kuhn came to accept that all scientists agree on a particular set of values [Kuhn, by Bird] |
15882 | Since there are three different dimensions for generalising laws, no one system of logic can cover them [Harré] |
4958 | Identities like 'heat is molecule motion' are necessary (in the highest degree), not contingent [Kripke] |
15286 | Clavius's Paradox: purely syntactic entailment theories won't explain, because they are too profuse [Harré/Madden] |
15283 | Simplicity can sort theories out, but still leaves an infinity of possibilities [Harré/Madden] |
15316 | The powers/natures approach has been so successful (for electricity, magnetism, gravity) it may be universal [Harré/Madden] |
8054 | Social sciences discover no law-like generalisations, and tend to ignore counterexamples [MacIntyre] |
3865 | Why should it matter whether or not a theory is scientific? [Newton-Smith] |
17503 | Theories can never represent accurately, because their components are abstract [Cartwright,N, by Portides] |
2458 | Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs [Fodor] |
16827 | If we make a hypothesis about data, then a deduction, where does the hypothesis come from? [Lipton] |
7021 | If the world is theory-dependent, the theories themselves can't be theory-dependent [Heil] |
17601 | Neither a priori rationalism nor sense data empiricism account for scientific knowledge [Thagard] |
8457 | The Principle of Conservatism says we should violate the minimum number of background beliefs [Orenstein] |
6805 | Relativity ousted Newtonian mechanics despite a loss of simplicity [Bird] |
6777 | Realists say their theories involve truth and the existence of their phenomena [Bird] |
6804 | There is no agreement on scientific method - because there is no such thing [Bird] |
19652 | How can we mathematically describe a world that lacks humans? [Meillassoux] |
19091 | Seeing reality mathematically makes it an object of thought, not of experience [Macbeth] |
22182 | Theories with unobservables are underdetermined by the evidence [Okasha] |
18614 | Vertical arguments say eliminate a term if it picks out different natural kinds in different theories [Machery] |
18615 | Horizontal arguments say eliminate a term if it fails to pick out a natural kind [Machery] |
18616 | If a term doesn't pick out a kind, keeping it may block improvements in classification [Machery] |
22192 | Is Newton simpler with universal simultaneity, or Einstein simpler without absolute time? [Gorham] |
22194 | Structural Realism says mathematical structures persist after theory rejection [Gorham] |
22195 | Structural Realists must show the mathematics is both crucial and separate [Gorham] |
22136 | Science begins with sufficient reason, de-animation, and the importance of nature [Boulter] |