| 13589 | Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine] |
| 18388 | Possible worlds don't fix necessities; intrinsic necessities imply the extension in worlds [Armstrong] |
| 4950 | Possible worlds are useful in set theory, but can be very misleading elsewhere [Kripke] |
| 6988 | Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework [Jackson] |
| 14683 | Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality [Salmon,N] |
| 11105 | We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien] |
| 11109 | If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien] |
| 11106 | If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien] |
| 11113 | Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien] |
| 11107 | If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien] |
| 11112 | Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien] |
| 13389 | The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems [Jubien] |
| 13390 | Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies [Jubien] |
| 9220 | Lewis must specify that all possibilities are in his worlds, making the whole thing circular [Shalkowski, by Sider] |
| 18496 | If possible worlds are just fictions, they can't be truthmakers for modal judgements [Heil] |
| 8320 | Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world? [Lowe] |
| 16538 | We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences [Lowe] |
| 10406 | One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer] |
| 12234 | Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible' [Oderberg] |
| 19299 | Possible worlds make every proposition true or false, which endorses classical logic [Hale] |
| 12464 | If some book described a possibe life for you, that isn't what makes such a life possible [Jacobs] |
| 12469 | Possible worlds semantics gives little insight into modality [Jacobs] |
| 18746 | Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18750 | Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18821 | Possibilities are like possible worlds, but not fully determinate or complete [Rumfitt] |
| 12203 | If a world is a fully determinate way things could have been, can anyone consider such a thing? [Rumfitt] |
| 22636 | Every philosophical theory must be true in some possible world, so the ontology is hopeless [Ingthorsson] |
| 22638 | Worlds may differ in various respects, but no overall similarity of worlds is implied [Ingthorsson] |
| 23710 | Dispositionalism says modality is in the powers of this world, not outsourced to possible worlds [Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |