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16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will

[what exactly a free will is understood to be]

30 ideas
Anaxagoras says mind remains pure, and so is not affected by what it changes [Anaxagoras, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Anaxagoras says that intellect (which is a cause of change) is not affected by or mixed in with anything else; for this is the only way in which it can cause change, while being itself changeless, and control things without mixing with them.
     From: report of Anaxagoras (fragments/reports [c.460 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 256b24
     A reaction: I suggest that this is the germ of the original concept of freewill - of the mind as somehow outside the causal processes of the world, so that it can initiate change without itself being affected by other causes. Aristotle says he's right; I disagree.
Aristotle never discusses free will [Aristotle, by MacIntyre]
     Full Idea: Aristotle never gets involved in the riddles of later philosophers about free will.
     From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.7
     A reaction: Note that this is a very great philosopher who was intensely interested in the well-springs of human action. 'Free will' never crossed his mind. This is because free will is nonsense. Owen Flanagan is best on this subject (Ideas 5345 and 5332).
For an action to be 'free', it must be deliberate as well as unconstrained [Aristotle, by Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Aristotle has rightly noted that we are not prepared to call an action 'free' unless as well as being unconstrained it is also deliberate.
     From: report of Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1111b06) by Gottfried Leibniz - New Essays on Human Understanding 2.21
     A reaction: This is quite an important message for David Hume. I love the respect which Leibniz accords Aristotle, at a time when he was becoming thoroughly unfashionable. This is the nearest Aristotle gets to discussing so-called 'free will'.
A human being fathers his own actions as he fathers his children [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: A human being fathers his own actions as he fathers his children.
     From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1113b18)
     A reaction: Ultimately Aristotle believes that free will is an absolute fact, once influences are stripped away. He should have questioned more deeply.
Epicurus was the first to see the free will problem, and he was a libertarian [Epicurus, by Long/Sedley]
     Full Idea: By posing the problem of determinism, Epicurus became arguably the first philosopher to recognise the philosophical centrality of what we call the Free Will Question. His strongly libertarian approach is strongly contrasted with Stoic determinism.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by AA Long / DN Sedley - Hellenic Philosophers commentary
     A reaction: Epicurus introduced the rather dubious 'swerve' of the atoms to make room for free will. It seems to me more consistent to stick with the determinism of Democritus. Zeno became a determinist in reaction to Epicurus.
We make progress when we improve and naturalise our choices, asserting their freedom [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: Progress is when any of you turns to his own faculty of choice, working at it and perfecting it, so as to bring it fully into harmony with nature; elevated, free, unrestrained, unhindered, faithful, self-respecting.
     From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.04.18)
     A reaction: [See also Disc.3.5.7] Rationality is the stoic concept of being in 'harmony with nature'. It appears (from reading Frede) that this may be the FIRST EVER reference to free will. Note the very rhetorical way in which it is presented.
Freedom is acting by choice, with no constraint possible [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: He is free for whom all things happen in accordance with his choice, and whom no one can constrain.
     From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.12.09)
     A reaction: Presumable this means that constraint is absolutely impossible, even by Zeus, and not just contingent possibility, when no one sees me raid the fridge.
Freedom is making all things happen by choice, without constraint [Epictetus]
     Full Idea: He is free for whom all things happen in accordance with his choice, and whom no one can constrain.
     From: Epictetus (The Discourses [c.56], 1.12.09)
     A reaction: The idea of 'free' will seems to have resulted from a wide extension of the idea of constraint, with global determinism lurking in the background.
Knowledge of present events doesn't make them necessary, so future events are no different [Boethius]
     Full Idea: Just as the knowledge of present things imposes no necessity on what is happening, so foreknowledge imposes no necessity on what is going to happen.
     From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], V.IV)
     A reaction: This, I think, is the key idea if you are looking for a theological answer to the theological problem of free will. Don't think of God as seeing the future 'now'. God is outside time, and so only observes all of history just as we observe the present.
Aquinas attributes freedom to decisions and judgements, and not to the will alone [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump]
     Full Idea: Aquinas conceives of freedom as free decision or judgement, which cannot be attributed to the will alone.
     From: report of Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Kretzmann/Stump - Aquinas, Thomas 12
     A reaction: This idea might improve the free will debate considerably, because it is not clear what sort of thing a 'will' is, and it is not clear how an entity can be 'free' in isolation, by its intrinsic nature. Isn't all freedom contextual?
Our 'will' just consists of the feeling that when we are motivated to do something, there are no external pressures [Descartes]
     Full Idea: The will consists solely in the fact that when something is proposed to us by our intellect either to affirm or deny, we are moved in such a way that we sense we are determined to it by no external force.
     From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §4.57)
Our free will is so self-evident to us that it must be a basic innate idea [Descartes]
     Full Idea: It is so evident that we are possessed of a free will that can give or withhold its assent, that this may be counted as one of the first and most common notions found innately in us.
     From: René Descartes (Principles of Philosophy [1646], I.39)
     A reaction: It seems to me plausible to say that we have an innate conception of our own will (our ability to make decisions), though Hume says we only learn about the will from experience, but the idea that it is absolutely 'free' might never cross our minds.
A thing is free if it acts by necessity of its own nature, and the act is determined by itself alone [Spinoza]
     Full Idea: That thing is called free which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is determined by itself alone.
     From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], I Def 7)
     A reaction: This points to the obvious thought that nothing is independent enough to achieve freedom. Our concept of nature is of almost endless interdependence. God seems the only thing that could possibly qualify, though some might say humans could.
We are free to decide not to follow our desires [Locke]
     Full Idea: We have a power to suspend the prosecution of this or that desire; as everyone daily may experiment in himself. This seems to me the source of all liberty, ..which is (as I think improperly) call'd 'free will'.
     From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.21.47)
     A reaction: This strikes me as a feeble defence of free will, since we have no idea of the origin of the decision not to act according to some desire. I see no sign of free will in introspection, despite what some people claim.
Future contingent events are certain, because God foresees them, but that doesn't make them necessary [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: We must distinguish between what is certain and what is necessary; everyone agrees that future contingents are certain, since God foresees them, but it is not thereby admitted that they are necessary.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Discourse on Metaphysics [1686], §13)
     A reaction: An interesting point, since there is presumably a difference between God foreseeing that future squares will have four corners, and His foreseeing the next war. It seems to me, though, that 'certainty' is bad enough news for free will, without necessity.
All theory is against free will, and all experience is in favour of it [Johnson,S]
     Full Idea: All theory is against free will, and all experience is in favour of it.
     From: Samuel Johnson (works [1770]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
We must assume an absolute causal spontaneity beginning from itself [Kant]
     Full Idea: It must be assumed that there is an absolute causal spontaneity beginning from itself.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B474/A446)
     A reaction: Note that this is part of the Antinomies (conflicts) of pure reason. This phrase is a beautiful statement of the dream that is free will.
Free will is a kind of causality which works independently of other causes [Kant]
     Full Idea: Will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings so far as they are rational. Freedom would then be the property this causality has of being able to work independently of determination by alien causes.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 446.97)
The capacity for freedom is above the laws of nature, with its own power of purpose and will [Fichte]
     Full Idea: This capacity [for freedom], once it exists, is in the servitude of a power which is higher than nature and quite free of its laws, the power of purposes, and the will.
     From: Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], 1)
     A reaction: You would think this could only refer to God, but he in fact is referring to the power of human free will. The clearest statement I have found of the weird human exceptionalism implied by a strong commitment to free will.
Forming purposes is absolutely free, and produces something from nothing [Fichte]
     Full Idea: My thinking and originating of a purpose is in its nature absolutely free and brings forth something from nothing.
     From: Johann Fichte (The Vocation of Man [1800], 3.I)
     A reaction: Modern fans of free will are more equivocal in their assertions, and would be uncomfortable bluntly claiming to 'get something from nothing'. But that's what free will is! Embrace it, or run for your life.
A free will primarily wills its own freedoom [Hegel, by Houlgate]
     Full Idea: For Hegel, the content or 'object' which any free will wills simply by virtue of being free is nothing other than its own freedom.
     From: report of Georg W.F.Hegel (Elements of the Philosophy of Right [1821], 027) by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 8 'The Limits'
     A reaction: Personally I take the concept of a wholly 'free' will to be vacuous, but this is a very interesting idea. I would delete 'by virtue of being free', and say that what we mean by free will is the will's desperation to be as free as possible. Love it.
Man IS freedom [Sartre]
     Full Idea: There is no determinism - man is free, man IS freedom. …Man is condemned to be free.
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Existentialism and Humanism [1945], p.34)
Whether we are free is uninteresting; we can only experience our freedom [Camus]
     Full Idea: Knowing whether or not a man is free doesn't interest me. I can only experience my own freedom.
     From: Albert Camus (The Myth of Sisyphus [1942], 'Abs free')
     A reaction: Camus has the right idea. Personally I think you could drop the word 'freedom', and just say that I am confronted by the need to make decisions.
Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt]
     Full Idea: The statement that a person enjoys freedom of the will means that he is free to want what he wants to want. More precisely, he is free to will what he wants to will, or to have the will he wants.
     From: Harry G. Frankfurt (Freedom of the Will and concept of a person [1971], §III)
     A reaction: A good proposal. It covers kleptomaniacs and drug addicts quite well. Thieves have second-order desires (to steal) of which kleptomaniacs are incapable. There is actually no such thing as free will, but this sort of thing will do.
The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is [Nagel]
     Full Idea: The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is.
     From: Thomas Nagel (Subjective and Objective [1979], p.198)
You can be free even though force would have prevented you doing otherwise [Dennett, by PG]
     Full Idea: If a brain implant would compel you to perform an action which you in fact freely choose, then you are free, but couldn't have done otherwise.
     From: report of Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §6.1) by PG - Db (ideas)
Can we conceive of a being with a will freer than our own? [Dennett]
     Full Idea: Can I even conceive of beings whose wills are freer than our own?
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Elbow Room: varieties of free will [1984], §7.3)
Free will is mental causation in action [McGinn]
     Full Idea: Free will is mental causation in action.
     From: Colin McGinn (The Mysterious Flame [1999], p.167)
Normal free will claims control of what I do, but a stronger view claims control of thought and feeling [Flanagan]
     Full Idea: The standard view of free will is that I have something like complete control over what I do. A stronger view (not widely held) is that I also have complete control over what I think and what I feel.
     From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p. 60n)
     A reaction: To claim free control of feelings looks optimistic, but it does look as if we can decide to think about something, such as a philosophical problem. Deciding what to say comes somewhere between thought and action.
Free will is held to give us a whole list of desirable capacities for living [Flanagan]
     Full Idea: Free will is said to give us self-control, self-expression, individuality, reasons-sensitivity, rational deliberation, rational accountability, moral accountability, the capacity to do otherwise, unpredictability, and political freedom.
     From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p.104)
     A reaction: Nice list. His obvious challenge is to either say we can live happily without some of these things, or else show how we can have them without 'free will'. Personally I agree with Flanagan that we meet the challenge.