| 22528 | The nature of all animate things is to have one part which rules it [Aristotle] |
| 21317 | Despite consciousness fluctuating, we are aware that it belongs to one person [Butler] |
| 9751 | To some extent we must view ourselves as noumena [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 21450 | Representation would be impossible without the 'I think' that accompanies it [Kant] |
| 22060 | The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep] |
| 22066 | Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte] |
| 22016 | The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
| 23243 | Consciousness of external things is always accompanied by an unnoticed consciousness of self [Fichte] |
| 22073 | The basis of philosophy is the Self prior to experience, where it is the essence of freedom [Schelling] |
| 21225 | The psychological ego is worldly, and the pure ego follows transcendental reduction [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
| 22323 | The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein] |
| 2940 | The subject stands outside our understanding of the world [Wittgenstein] |
| 7109 | If you think of '2+2=4' as the content of thought, the self must be united transcendentally [Sartre] |
| 3827 | The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle] |
| 3285 | We may be unable to abandon personal identity, even when split-brains have undermined it [Nagel] |
| 3293 | If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel] |
| 3244 | Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori [Nagel] |
| 3245 | The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity [Nagel] |
| 7385 | People accept blurred boundaries in many things, but insist self is All or Nothing [Dennett] |
| 19650 | The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible [Meillassoux] |