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23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique

[reasons against virtue theory]

19 ideas
Aristotle neglects the place of rules in the mature virtuous person [Annas on Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Aristotle has not thought through the place of rules in the virtuous person's thought. He moves from the problem-solving of the learner to the immediate sensitivity of the fully virtuous without explaining the structure of the latter's thinking.
     From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 2.4
     A reaction: Good point. If Kantians are all rules, then Aristotle is a very good corrective, but the fact is that many people live well by following good rules, or at least good guidelines. They can be taught (or written on a poster).
Greeks elevate virtues enormously, but never explain them [Descartes]
     Full Idea: The ancient pagans place virtues on a high plateau and make them appear the most valuable thing in the world, but they do not sufficiently instruct us about how to know them.
     From: René Descartes (A Discourse on Method [1637], §1.8)
Kant thinks virtue becomes passive, and hence morally unaccountable [Kant, by Annas]
     Full Idea: Kant thinks that if virtue becomes a stable disposition of the person, then it turns into a rigid mechanical habit, with respect to which the person is passive, and thus not fully morally accountable.
     From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 2.1
When aristocracy or the bourgeoisie dominate, certain values dominate with them [Marx/Engels]
     Full Idea: During the time that the aristocracy was dominant, the concepts honour, loyalty etc. were dominant, and during the dominance of the bourgeoisie the concepts of freedom, equality etc.
     From: K Marx / F Engels (The German Ideology [1846], §1.B)
     A reaction: This is a very anti-Aristotelian view, based on a very different idea of human nature. It must, to some extent, be true, but freedom and equality will be a value for the proletariat, and loyalty will be a key value if the family is central.
Virtues must be highly personal; if not, it is merely respect for a concept [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: A virtue has to be our invention, our most personal defence and necessity: in any other sense it is merely a danger. What does not condition our life harms it: a virtue merely from a feeling of respect for the concept 'virtue', as Kant desires it, is harm
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Anti-Christ [1889], §11)
     A reaction: Presumably he sees virtue as the cutting edge of stiffling conventional morality. I'm a bit nervous about embracing highly personal virtues, partly because they might isolate me from my community. I ain't no übermensch.
Virtue has been greatly harmed by the boringness of its advocates [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: May I be forgiven for the discovery that 'virtue' has been harmed by nothing more than it has been by the boringness of its advocates.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Beyond Good and Evil [1886], §228)
Many virtues are harmful traps, but that is why other people praise them [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Virtues like industriousness, obedience, chastity, filial piety and justice are usually harmful to those who possess them. When you have a real, whole virtue you are its victim. But your neighbour praises your virtue precisely on that account.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Gay (Joyful) Science [1882], §021)
     A reaction: This is the conspiracy theory of virtue. We want people to do menial or undesirable jobs, so we dress them up as wonderful virtues, and make people feel good for possessing them. There must be some truth in this.
You are mastered by your own virtues, but you must master them, and turn them into tools [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: You had to become your own master, and also the master of your own virtues. Previously, your virtues were your master; but they must be nothing more than your tools.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Human, All Too Human [1878], 006)
     A reaction: What on earth would Aristotle make of that? Nietzsche offers a sort of metatheory for virtues. I take this to be a form of particularism - that you live by your virtues, but occasionally you can discard a virtue if it seems right. Lie, steal...
Virtue is wasteful, as it reduces us all to being one another's nurse [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Nothing would be more expensive than virtue: for in the end it would give us the earth as an infirmary, and 'Everyone to be everyone else's nurse' would be the pinnacle of wisdom.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Writings from Late Notebooks [1887], 04[7])
     A reaction: Once again, I think that Nietzsche does not understand Aristotelian virtue theory. This attacks Christian virtue (his bęte noir), with its emphasis on compassion and humility. A truly virtuous person is more likely to be an artist/politician/philosopher.
Virtue for everyone removes its charm of being exceptional and aristocratic [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The preachers of virtue are its worst enemies. For they teach virtue as an ideal for everyone; they take from virtue the charm of the rare, the inimitable, the exceptional and unaverage - it aristocratic magic.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Writings from Late Notebooks [1887], 10[109])
     A reaction: At last I think I have found why Nietzsche disliked Aristotle, who makes elementary 'phronesis' (practical reason) a sufficient intellectual endowment to achieve virtue, with no need of more than moderate wealth or power. I prefer Aristotle.
Nietzsche thought our psychology means there can't be universal human virtues [Nietzsche, by Foot]
     Full Idea: Nietzsche believed, in effect, that as the facts of human psychology really were, there could be no such thing as human virtues, dispositions good in any man.
     From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (Works (refs to 8 vol Colli and Montinari) [1885]) by Philippa Foot - Nietzsche's Immoralism p.157
     A reaction: Presumably each individual can only have virtues appropriate to their individual nature, which is something like channelling their personal psychological drives. Can't we each have our individual version of courage or honesty?
Virtues won't generate an obligation, so it isn't a basis for morality [Prichard]
     Full Idea: It is untrue to urge that, since courage is a virtue, we ought to act courageously. We feel an obligation to act, but not from a certain desire. The action is done from obligation, so isn't an act of courage. ..In fact, virtue is no basis for morality.
     From: H.A. Prichard (Does moral phil rest on a mistake? [1912])
     A reaction: One of the few interesting and direct attacks on virtue theory, before its modern revival. Prichard urges a perception of what is valuable (or good) as the basis for obligation and right action. He is right that values come first, in virtue and elsewhere.
Good and bad are a matter of actions, not of internal dispositions [Foot]
     Full Idea: Some philosophers insist that dispositions, motives and other 'internal' elements are the primary determinants of moral goodness and badness. I have never been a 'virtue ethicist' is this sense. For me it is what is done that stands in this position.
     From: Philippa Foot (Rationality and Goodness [2004], p.2), quoted by John Hacker-Wright - Philippa Foot's Moral Thought 4 'Virtue'
     A reaction: [She mentions Hursthouse, Slote, Swanton] I'm quite struck by this. Aristotle insists that morality concerns actions. It doesn't seem that a person could be a saint by having wonderful dispositions, but doing nothing. Paraplegics?
To explain generosity in a person, you must understand a generous action [Dummett]
     Full Idea: It cannot be explained what it is for a person to be generous without first explaining what it is for an action to be generous.
     From: Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 4)
     A reaction: I presume a slot machine can't be 'generous', even if it favours the punter, so you can't specify a generous action without making reference to the person. A benign circle, as Aristotle says.
Virtue is secondary to a role-figure, defined within a culture [MacIntyre, by Statman]
     Full Idea: MacIntyre argues that the concept of virtue is secondary to that of a role-figure, where the latter is always defined by some particular tradition and culture.
     From: report of Alasdair MacIntyre (After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory [1981]) by Daniel Statman - Introduction to Virtue Ethics §3
     A reaction: MacIntyre is much more of a relativist than Aristotle. There must be some attempt to deal with the problem of a rotten culture which throws up a corrupt role-model. We need a concept of a good culture and of individual flourishing.
Virtue theory needs an external standard to judge behaviour and character [Inwagen, by Statman]
     Full Idea: Virtue theory leaves out something essential, namely, the existence of a standard of behaviour which is prior to and independent of human character, in terms of which we evaluate the behaviour and character of ourselves and others.
     From: report of Peter van Inwagen (Response to Slote [1990]) by Daniel Statman - Introduction to Virtue Ethics §5
     A reaction: This sounds very like Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy. Personally I prefer Aristotle's naturalistic reliance on human nature and function to Moore's totally unjustified intuitionist Platonism. How can anything be good if it isn't supposed to do anything?
Virtue ethics is open to the objection that it fails to show priority among the virtues [Hursthouse]
     Full Idea: One criticism of virtue ethics is that it lamentably fails to come up with a priority ranking of the virtues.
     From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.2)
     A reaction: However, one might refer to man's essential function, or characteristic function, and one might derive the virtues of a good citizen from the nature of a good society.
Virtue theory isn't a genuine ethical theory, because it doesn't have universal application [Statman]
     Full Idea: It can be claimed that universality is a necessary property of any ethical theory and therefore virtue theory, which fails in this respect, is not a theory, and hence poses no alternative to genuine ethical theories.
     From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §5)
     A reaction: Replies: a) totally universal morality is an idle dream (part of the 'Enlightenment Project' to prove everything) and we must settle for something more relative; b) virtues aren't totally universal, but they are truths about humanity. I prefer b).
Promises create moral duties that have nothing to do with character [Statman]
     Full Idea: That duties are created irrespective of facts about character is obvious from the case of promises, which bind their makers irrespective of their motives or personality.
     From: Daniel Statman (Introduction to Virtue Ethics [1997], §5)
     A reaction: Just occasionally a promise can be broken, by a sensitive and wise person. I promise to give your son some money; I then discover he is a drug dealer. Promises arise out of character, and cannot be made by robots.