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3028
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The chief good is unity, sometimes seen as prudence, or God, or intellect
[Eucleides]
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Full Idea:
The chief good is unity, which is known by several names, for at one time people call it prudence, at another time God, at another intellect, and so on.
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From:
Eucleides (fragments/reports [c.410 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.9.2
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A reaction:
So the chief good is what unites and focuses our moral actions. Kant calls that 'the will'.
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393
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Good first, then beauty, then reason, then knowledge, then pleasure
[Plato, by PG]
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Full Idea:
Good is supreme, followed by beauty, then reason, then knowledge, then pure pleasure, then mixed pleasure.
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From:
report of Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 67a) by PG - Db (ideas)
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A reaction:
He tells us that pure pleasures are simple pleasures. Epicurus presumably read this. No mention of truth, unless that is part of reason. Why does he value beauty so highly?
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5131
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Intelligence and sight, and some pleasures and honours, are candidates for being good in themselves
[Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
What sort of things can one posit as good in themselves? Everything that is pursued even when considered in isolation - intelligence, for example, and sight, and some pleasures and honours?
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From:
Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1096b15)
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A reaction:
He means good-for-man, of course. If only 'some' pleasures are good, that implies a further good which is used to judge the pleasures. For Aristotle what is 'fine' (kalon) is the ultimate self-evident good.
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5135
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Goods are external, of the soul, and of the body; those of the soul (such as action) come first
[Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
Goods have been classified (by Plato) under three heads, as external, or of the soul, or of the body; of these we say that goods of the soul are good in the strictest and fullest sense, and we rank actions as goods of the soul.
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From:
Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1098b13)
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A reaction:
Aristotle is famous (or notorious) for allowing external goods in his theory, but it is important that he always makes them subordinate to the central goods. Wealth and glamour could never compensate for vice.
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5110
|
Goodness is when a thing (such as a circle) is complete, and conforms with its nature
[Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
Goodness is a kind of completion: it is when something becomes as good as it may be that we say that it is complete, because that is when it pre-eminently conforms with its nature. A circle is complete when it is as good a circle as there could be.
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From:
Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 246a12)
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A reaction:
This, in turn, is said by Aristotle to result from the telos (purpose) of the thing. This won't eliminate the problem of relativism, unless we say that something cannot have an evil 'nature'. Was the Black Death good, by this definition?
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20843
|
Final goods: confidence, prudence, freedom, enjoyment and no pain, good spirits, virtue
[Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius]
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Full Idea:
Stoics say that confidence and prudence and freedom and enjoyment and good spirits and freedom from pain and every virtuous action are final (as opposed to instrumental) goods.
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From:
report of Stoic school (fragments/reports [c.200 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 07.96
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A reaction:
An interesting and unusual list. I've never seen 'confidence' or 'good spirits' mentioned. 'Freedom' is also unusual, but probably just means not being enslaved.
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22755
|
Like a warming fire, what is good by nature should be good for everyone
[Sext.Empiricus]
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Full Idea:
Just as fire which is warmth-giving by nature warms all men, and does not chill some of them, so what is good by nature ought to be good for all, and not good for some but not good for others.
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From:
Sextus Empiricus (Against the Ethicists (one book) [c.180], II.69)
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A reaction:
This is going to confine the naturally good to the basics of life, which we all share. Is a love of chess a natural good? It seems to capture an aspect of human nature, without appealing to everyone. Sextus says nothing is good for everyone.
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8117
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Perfection comes through the senses (Beauty), through reason (Truth), and through moral will (Good)
[Baumgarten, by Tolstoy]
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Full Idea:
For Baumgarten, Beauty is the Perfect (the Absolute), recognised through the senses; Truth is the Perfect perceived through reason; Goodness is the Perfect reached by moral will.
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From:
report of Alexander Baumgarten (Aesthetica [1739]) by Leo Tolstoy - What is Art? Ch.3
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A reaction:
At last, after many years of searching, I have found the origin of that great trio of ideals: Beauty, Goodness and Truth. Tolstoy sneers at them, but a person could do a lot worse than spending their lives trying to promote them.
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19450
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Reason, love and will are the highest perfections and essence of man - the purpose of his life
[Feuerbach]
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Full Idea:
Reason, love and power of will are perfections of man; they are his highest powers, his absolute essence in so far as he is man, the purpose of his existence. Man exists in order to think, love and will.
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From:
Ludwig Feuerbach (Introduction of 'Essence of Christianity' [1841], I)
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A reaction:
Feuerbach was a notable atheist, but adopts a religious style of language which modern atheists would find rather alien. Personally I love talk of ideals and perfections. Ideals have been discredited in modern times, but need a revival.
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5910
|
The three intrinsic goods are virtue, knowledge and pleasure
[Ross]
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Full Idea:
There are three main things which are intrinsically good - virtue, knowledge, and with certain limitations, pleasure.
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From:
W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §II)
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A reaction:
This combines the views of most of the main schools of ancient Greece. For Socrates, knowledge delivers the others; for Aristippus, pleasure eclipses the others; for Zeno of Citium, virtue is all that matters. Ross is a pluralist, like Aristotle.
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5932
|
The four goods are: virtue, pleasure, just allocation of pleasure, and knowledge
[Ross]
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Full Idea:
Four things seem to be intrinsically good - virtue, pleasure, the allocation of pleasure to the virtuous, and knowledge.
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From:
W. David Ross (The Right and the Good [1930], §V)
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A reaction:
I greatly admire a philosopher who has the courage to assert such a thing, in the face of centuries of scepticism about anyone's ability to even get started in this area. We need the bold assertions first; we can work back to doubts later, if necessary.
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22379
|
The meaning of 'good' and other evaluations must include the object to which they attach
[Foot]
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Full Idea:
There is no describing the evaluative meaning of 'good', evaluation, commending, or anything of the sort, without fixing the object to which they are supposed to be attached.
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From:
Philippa Foot (Moral Beliefs [1959], p.112)
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A reaction:
I go further, and say that a specification of the feature(s) of the object that produce the value must also be available (if requested). 'That's a good car, but I've no idea why' makes no sense. 'Apparently that's a good car', if other people know why.
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