structure for 'Theory of Logic'    |     alphabetical list of themes    |     expand these ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names

[general ideas about how names function in sentences]

30 ideas
A name is a sort of tool [Plato]
A name-giver might misname something, then force other names to conform to it [Plato]
Things must be known before they are named, so it can't be the names that give us knowledge [Plato]
People who can't apply names usually don't understand the thing to which it applies [Leibniz]
All names are names of something, real or imaginary [Mill]
In 'Etna is higher than Vesuvius' the whole of Etna, including all the lava, can't be the reference [Frege]
You can understand 'author of Waverley', but to understand 'Scott' you must know who it applies to [Russell]
There are a set of criteria for pinning down a logically proper name [Sainsbury on Russell]
Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI]
A person's name doesn't mean their body; bodies don't sit down, and their existence can be denied [Wittgenstein]
Naming is a preparation for description [Wittgenstein]
If we had to name objects to make existence claims, we couldn't discuss all the real numbers [Quine]
Nominalists see proper names as a main vehicle of reference [Marcus (Barcan)]
Anything which refers tends to be called a 'name', even if it isn't a noun [Marcus (Barcan)]
Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam]
Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga]
Names are rigid, making them unlike definite descriptions [Sainsbury on Kripke]
Names are rigid designators, which designate the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke]
We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans]
How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans]
A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans]
In logic, a name is just any expression which refers to a particular single object [Bostock]
'Paderewski' has two names in mentalese, for his pianist file and his politician file [Fodor]
Names in thought afford a primitive way to bring John before the mind [Fodor]
'Jocasta' needs to be distinguished from 'Oedipus's mother' because they are connected by different properties [Fodor]
We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes [Jubien]
The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category [Jubien]
Philosophy is stuck on the Fregean view that an individual is anything with a proper name [Simons]
We negate predicates but do not negate names [Westerhoff]
Semantic theory should specify when an act of naming is successful [Sawyer]