7686 | For Aristotle, there are only as many properties as actually exist [Aristotle, by Jacquette] |
12673 | Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis] |
13587 | There is no property of 'fragility', as things are each fragile in a distinctive way [Ellis] |
15728 | The naturalness of a class depends as much on the observers as on the objects [Quinton] |
9407 | Properties imply natural classes which can be picked out by everybody [Quinton] |
8543 | Genuine properties are closely related to genuine changes [Shoemaker] |
8551 | Properties must be essentially causal if we can know and speak about them [Shoemaker] |
8557 | To ascertain genuine properties, examine the object directly [Shoemaker] |
15281 | Humeans see predicates as independent, but science says they are connected [Harré/Madden] |
14996 | Natural properties give similarity, joint carving, intrinsicness, specificity, homogeneity... [Lewis] |
15743 | Defining natural properties by means of laws of nature is potentially circular [Lewis] |
15744 | We can't define natural properties by resemblance, if they are used to explain resemblance [Lewis] |
15740 | I don't take 'natural' properties to be fixed by the nature of one possible world [Lewis] |
15752 | We might try defining the natural properties by a short list of them [Lewis] |
16262 | Sparse properties rest either on universals, or on tropes, or on primitive naturalness [Lewis, by Maudlin] |
15451 | I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world [Lewis] |
10717 | Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects [Lewis, by Oliver] |
16217 | Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity [Lewis, by Hawley] |
8585 | Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties [Lewis] |
8613 | Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated [Lewis] |
8586 | Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains [Lewis] |
8589 | For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes [Lewis] |
15460 | All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic [Lewis, by Lewis] |
15726 | Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals [Lewis] |
11916 | 'Being physical' is a second-order property [Molnar] |
4603 | Functionalists in Fodor's camp usually say that a genuine property is one that figures in some causal laws [Heil] |
10417 | There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer] |
14933 | Scientific properties are defined by the laws that embody them [Psillos, by Ladyman/Ross] |
16253 | A property is fundamental if two objects can differ in only that respect [Maudlin] |
14932 | Causal essentialism says properties are nothing but causal relations [Ladyman/Ross] |