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8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties

[actualised properties, rather than conditional ones]

29 ideas
Some things said 'of' a subject are not 'in' the subject [Aristotle]
We call them secondary 'substances' because they reveal the primary substances [Aristotle]
Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical [Ellis on Armstrong]
I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis]
Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis]
Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis]
The passive view of nature says categorical properties are basic, but others say dispositions [Ellis]
Typical 'categorical' properties are spatio-temporal, such as shape [Ellis]
The property of 'being an electron' is not of anything, and only electrons could have it [Ellis]
Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property [Kim]
The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion [Lewis]
Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects [Heil on Lewis]
Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis]
'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers [Molnar]
If reality just has relational properties, what are its substantial ontological features? [Robinson,H]
A stone does not possess the property of being a stone; its other properties make it a stone [Heil]
Categorical properties were introduced by philosophers as actual properties, not if-then properties [Heil]
Properties are respects in which particular objects may be alike or differ [Mellor/Oliver]
Categorical properties and dispositions appear to explain one another [Mumford]
There are four reasons for seeing categorical properties as the most fundamental [Mumford]
Categorical predicates are those unconnected to functions [Mumford]
Proper ontology should only use categorical (actual) properties, not hypothetical ones [Sider]
Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Bird]
Categorical properties are not modally fixed, but change across possible worlds [Bird]
The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself [Bird]
If we abstractly define a property, that doesn't mean some object could possess it [Bird]
Categoricalists take properties to be quiddities, with no essential difference between them [Bird]
'Categorical' properties exist in the actual world, and 'hypothetical' properties in other worlds [Koslicki]
17th century authors only recognised categorical properties, never dispositions [Pasnau]