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1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics

[seeking rhetorical explanation instead of hard facts]

14 ideas
An interpreter of a text, because of wider knowledge, can understand it better than its author [Schleiermacher, by Mautner]
     Full Idea: Schleiermacher proposed that an interpreter of a text may be in a better position to see the author's life and work and historical setting as a whole, and so understand the text better than its author.
     From: report of Friedrich Schleiermacher (works [1825]) by Thomas Mautner - Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy p.248
     A reaction: This sounds like a very quaintly old-fashioned enlightenment view which has been swept away by post-modernism, which is why I agree with it. We have a perspective on Descartes now which he could never have dreamt of.
Unity emerges from understanding particulars, so understanding is prior to seeing unity [Schleiermacher]
     Full Idea: We only gradually arrive at the knowledge of the inner unity via the understanding of individual utterances, and therefore the art of explication is also presupposed if the inner unity is to be found....The task is infinite, and can never be accomplished.
     From: Friedrich Schleiermacher (works [1825], p.235), quoted by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 06
     A reaction: [p.235 in ed Bowie 1998] This is the first statement of the hermeneutic circle, which needs whole to grasp parts, and parts to grasp whole. Personally I think the dangers of circles in philosophy are greatly exaggerated.
The claim of hermeneutics to give knowledge through understanding is challenged by positivism [Mautner on Dilthey]
     Full Idea: The claim of hermeneutics to give understanding instead of explanation can be seen as part of the theory of knowledge, but it seems to be incompatible with the most accepted aspects of positivism.
     From: comment on Wilhelm Dilthey (works [1883]) by Thomas Mautner - Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy p.248
     A reaction: So much the worse for positivism. The same conflict occurs in modern philosophy of mind. God can be a positivist if he likes, but we must settle for hermeneutics for a lot of our knowledge. We are discussing method, not ontology.
A text has many interpretations, but no 'correct' one [Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: The same text allows innumerable interpretations: there is no 'correct' interpretation.
     From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Fragments from 1885-1886 [1886], 1[120])
     A reaction: It is hard to defend a 'correct' interpretation, but I think it is obvious to students of literature that some interpretations are very silly, such as reading things allegorically when there was no such intention.
A text explained ceases to be a text [Cioran]
     Full Idea: Why embroider upon what excludes commentary? A text explained is not longer a text.
     From: E.M. Cioran (The Trouble with Being Born [1973], 09)
     A reaction: I like that. I'm not a great fan of explicating texts, especially if they are literary, where the whole point is the primary experience, of a novel, poem or play. Philosophy is different, because that is a dialogue between writer and reader.
Hermeneutics of tradition is sympathetic, hermeneutics of suspicion is hostile [Ricoeur, by Mautner]
     Full Idea: Ricoeur distinguishes a hermeneutics of tradition (e.g. Gadamar), which interprets sympathetically looking for hidden messages, and a hermeneutics of suspicion (e.g. Nietzsche, Freud) which sees hidden drives and interests.
     From: report of Paul Ricoeur (works [1970]) by Thomas Mautner - Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy p.249
     A reaction: Obviously the answer is somewhere between the two. Nietzsche's suspicion can be wonderful, but Freud's can seem silly (e.g. on Leonardo). On the whole I am on the 'tradition' side, because great thinkers can rise above their culture (on a good day).
Hermeneutics blunts truth, by conforming it to the interpreter [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J]
     Full Idea: Derrida worried that hermeneutics blunts the disruptive power of truth by forcing it conform to the interpreter's mental horizon.
     From: report of Jacques Derrida (works [1990]) by Jens Zimmermann - Hermeneutics: a very short introduction 3 'The heart'
     A reaction: Good heavens - I agree with Derrida. Very French, though, to see the value of truth in its disruptiveness. I tend to find the truth reassuring, but then I'm English.
Interpretations can be interpreted, so there is no original 'meaning' available [Derrida]
     Full Idea: Because interpretations of texts can be interpreted, they can therefore have no 'original meaning'.
     From: Jacques Derrida (works [1990]), quoted by Barry Stocker - Derrida on Deconstruction
Hermeneutics is hostile, trying to overcome the other person's difference [Derrida, by Zimmermann,J]
     Full Idea: Derrida described the hermeneutic impulse to understand another as a form of violence that seeks to overcome the other's particularity and unique difference.
     From: report of Jacques Derrida (works [1990]) by Jens Zimmermann - Hermeneutics: a very short introduction App 'Derrida'
     A reaction: I'm not sure about 'violence', but Derrida was on to somethng here. The 'hermeneutic circle' sounds like a creepy process of absorption, where the original writer disappears in a whirlpool of interpretation.
The 'hermeneutic circle' says parts and wholes are interdependent, and so cannot be interpreted [Mautner]
     Full Idea: The 'hermeneutic circle' consists in the fact that an interpretation of part of a text requires a prior understanding of the whole, and the interpretation of the whole requires a prior understanding of its parts.
     From: Thomas Mautner (Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy [1996], p.247)
     A reaction: This strikes me as a benign circle, solved the way Aristotle solves the good man/good action circle. You make a start somewhere, like a child learning to speak, and work your way into the circle. Not really a problem.
Knowledge is not a static set of correct propositions, but a continuing search for better interpretations [Polt]
     Full Idea: Thanks to Heidegger, hermeneutics has gained wider acceptance - that knowledge is not a static set of correct propositions, but a continuing search for better interpretations.
     From: Richard Polt (Heidegger: an introduction [1999], 3.§7)
     A reaction: I am not sure if I understand the notion of a search that has a refusal to actually find anything as one of its basic principles.
Interpreting a text is representing it as making sense [Morris,M]
     Full Idea: Interpreting a text is a matter of making sense of it. And to make sense of a text is to represent it as making sense.
     From: Michael Morris (Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus [2008], Intro.2)
     A reaction: 'Making sense' is obviously not a very precise or determinate concept. It is probably better to say that the process is 'trying' to make sense of the text, because most texts don't totally make sense.
The hermeneutic circle is either within the text, or between text and biased reader [Norden]
     Full Idea: The first type of hermeneutic circle operates inside the text, studying relationships between sentences. …The second type is between the text and the reader, …who brings assumptions about what it means.
     From: Bryan van Norden (Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy [2011], App A.I)
     A reaction: The first kind is an essential aspect of reading well. Readers are biased, but I get very tired of those who do nothing but search for bias, and ignore the truth a text has to offer. If everything is bias, intellectual life is dead.
Heremeneutics is either 'faith' (examining truth) or 'suspicion' (looking for hidden motives) [Norden]
     Full Idea: A 'hermeneutics of faith' treat a text as a candidate for truth. ….A 'hermeneutics of suspicion' looks not for truth but for explanations of why someone makes certain claims, …particularly to serve their ulterior interests.
     From: Bryan van Norden (Intro to Classical Chinese Philosophy [2011], App I.1)
     A reaction: As far as I can see, the suspicious approach was a legitimate development in sociology, which studies the sources of ideas, but is absurdly offered by some philosophers as a total replacement of the faith approach.