| 23206 | Schematic minds think thoughts are truer if they slot into a scheme [Nietzsche] |
| 21497 | If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing] |
| 6873 | Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman] |
| 8879 | Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa] |
| 8813 | If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress [Pollock] |
| 8891 | My incoherent beliefs about art should not undermine my very coherent beliefs about physics [Bonjour] |
| 8892 | Coherence seems to justify empirical beliefs about externals when there is no external input [Bonjour] |
| 8894 | Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth [Bonjour] |
| 3590 | Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M] |
| 3589 | Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M] |
| 2732 | Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R] |
| 2733 | It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R] |
| 2734 | A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R] |
| 6354 | Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6367 | Coherence theories isolate justification from the world [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 10340 | Individualistic coherentism lacks access to all of my beliefs, or critical judgement of my assessment [Kusch] |
| 10345 | Individual coherentism cannot generate the necessary normativity [Kusch] |
| 7297 | My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 21496 | Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson] |
| 21499 | Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson] |
| 21502 | A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson] |
| 21512 | Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson] |
| 19721 | Coherence theories struggle with the role of experience [Mittag] |