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7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality

[treating some aspects of reality as inherently vague]

15 ideas
In actual things nothing is indefinite [Leibniz]
To say reality itself is vague is not properly intelligible [Dummett]
Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter [Jackson]
Nothing is true, but everything is exact [Baudrillard]
Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Evans, by Lowe]
Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries? [Evans]
There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Evans, by Lewis]
Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Evans, by Lewis]
If 'red' is vague, then membership of the set of red things is vague, so there is no set of red things [Sainsbury]
Objects such as a cloud or Mount Everest seem to have fuzzy boundaries in nature [Keefe/Smith]
There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson]
Equally fuzzy objects can be identical, so fuzziness doesn't entail vagueness [Williamson]
Non-linguistic things cannot be indeterminate, because they don't have truth-values at all [Hawley]
Maybe for the world to be vague, it must be vague in its foundations? [Hawley]
A crumbling statue can't become vague, because vagueness is incoherent [Merricks]