| 6006 | If you say truly that you are lying, you are lying [Eubulides, by Dancy,R] |
| 9464 | One of their own prophets said that Cretans are always liars [Anon (Titus)] |
| 21564 | Vicious Circle: what involves ALL must not be one of those ALL [Russell] |
| 21567 | 'All judgements made by Epimenedes are true' needs the judgements to be of the same type [Russell] |
| 19187 | The Liar makes us assert a false sentence, so it must be taken seriously [Tarski] |
| 8940 | Tarski avoids the Liar Paradox, because truth cannot be asserted within the object language [Tarski, by Fisher] |
| 6569 | 'This sentence is false' sends us in a looping search for its proposition [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
| 21692 | If we write it as '"this sentence is false" is false', there is no paradox [Quine] |
| 14964 | The Liar reappears, even if one insists on propositions instead of sentences [Gupta] |
| 14969 | Strengthened Liar: either this sentence is neither-true-nor-false, or it is not true [Gupta] |
| 13507 | The machinery used to solve the Liar can be rejigged to produce a new Liar [Hart,WD] |
| 9138 | An infinite series of sentences asserting falsehood produces the paradox without self-reference [Yablo, by Sorensen] |
| 15428 | The Liar seems like a truth-value 'gap', but dialethists see it as a 'glut' [Burgess] |
| 13372 | There are Liar Pairs, and Liar Chains, which fit the same pattern as the basic Liar [Priest,G] |
| 13371 | If you know that a sentence is not one of the known sentences, you know its truth [Priest,G] |
| 11014 | Self-reference paradoxes seem to arise only when falsity is involved [Read] |
| 9137 | Banning self-reference would outlaw 'This very sentence is in English' [Sorensen] |
| 15355 | Strengthened Liar: 'this sentence is not true in any context' - in no context can this be evaluated [Horsten] |
| 16336 | The liar paradox applies truth to a negated truth (but the conditional will serve equally) [Halbach] |