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2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason

[what good reasoning aims to achieve]

27 ideas
We ought to follow where the argument leads us [Plato]
     Full Idea: We ought to follow where the argument leads us.
     From: Plato (The Laws [c.348 BCE], 667a)
Reason grasps generalities, while the senses grasp particulars [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Reason grasps generalities, while the senses grasp particulars.
     From: Aristotle (Physics [c.337 BCE], 189a06)
     A reaction: This does not seem to be entirely true. Sherlock Holmes reasons towards the particular. Nevertheless, we see what he means. Reason deals with universals, and reason derives principles and patterns from the particulars.
Reasoning distinguishes what is beneficial, and hence what is right [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Logos is for the purpose of clarifying the beneficial and the harmful and as a result the right and the wrong.
     From: Aristotle (Politics [c.332 BCE], 1253a12)
     A reaction: I don't think this is asserting that reason can perceive values. Logos perceives the essential nature (and hence purpose) of each thing (including people), which indicates which are its good and bad states.
Reasoning is a way of making statements which makes them lead on to other statements [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Reasoning is based on certain statements made in such a way as necessarily to cause the assertion of things other than those statements and as a result of those statements.
     From: Aristotle (Sophistical Refutations [c.331 BCE], 165a01)
Aristotle is the supreme optimist about the ability of logos to explain nature [Roochnik on Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Aristotle is the great theoretician who articulates a vision of a world in which natural and stable structures can be rationally discovered. His is the most optimistic and richest view of the possibilities of logos
     From: comment on Aristotle (works [c.330 BCE]) by David Roochnik - The Tragedy of Reason p.95
The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas]
     Full Idea: Mind is compelled by necessary truths that can't be regarded as false, but not by contingent ones that might be false.
     From: Thomas Aquinas (Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo [1271], Q6.h to 12)
The secret of the method is to recognise which thing in a series is the simplest [Descartes]
     Full Idea: It is necessary, in a series of objects, to recognise which is the simplest thing, and how all the others depart from it. This rule contains the whole secret of the method.
     From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 06)
     A reaction: This is an appealing thought, though deciding the criteria for 'simplest' looks tough. Are electrons, for example, simple? Is a person a simple basic thing?
Methodical thinking is cautious, analytical, systematic, and panoramic [Descartes, by PG]
     Full Idea: Descartes' four principles for his method of thinking are: be cautious, analyse the problem, be systematic from simple to complex, and keep an overview of the problem
     From: report of René Descartes (A Discourse on Method [1637], §2.18) by PG - Db (ideas)
Reason says don't assent to uncertain principles, just as much as totally false ones [Descartes]
     Full Idea: Reason now persuades me that I should withhold my assent no less carefully from opinions that are not completely certain and indubitable than I would from those that are patently false.
     From: René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §1.18)
In so far as men live according to reason, they will agree with one another [Spinoza]
     Full Idea: Men necessarily always agree with one another in so far as they live according to the guidance of reason.
     From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], IV Pr 35)
     A reaction: I think this was my earliest motivation for getting interested in philosophy. Oddly, the Socratic tradition of philosophy is to challenge and criticise, but the aim is agreement. I sort of believe this idea, despite its wild idealism.
Without reason and human help, human life is misery [Spinoza]
     Full Idea: Without mutual help and the cultivation of reason, human beings necessarily live in great misery.
     From: Baruch de Spinoza (Tractatus Theologico-Politicus [1670], 16.05)
     A reaction: A clarion call from a great voice of the Enlightenment. I agree, but in 2017 the rest of western civilization seems to have given up on this ideal. I blame Adorno and Horkheimer.
The two basics of reasoning are contradiction and sufficient reason [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The two first principles of reasoning are: the principle of contradiction, and the principle of the need for giving a reason.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (A Specimen of Discoveries [1686], p.75)
     A reaction: Could animals have any reasoning ability (say, in solving a physical problem)? Leibniz's criteria both require language. Note the overlapping of the principle of sufficient reason (there IS a reason) with the contractual idea of GIVING reasons.
For Leibniz rationality is based on non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason [Leibniz, by Benardete,JA]
     Full Idea: Leibniz distinguished two fundamental principles of rationality - the principle of non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason.
     From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (works [1690]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.18
Reason keeps asking why until explanation is complete [Kant, by Korsgaard]
     Full Idea: For Kant, theoretical reason, like practical reason, seeks the unconditioned: it keeps asking why until explanation is complete.
     From: report of Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781]) by Christine M. Korsgaard - Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value 8 'Kant'
     A reaction: I love this idea. It is so important in philosophy of science, because some theorists say we should give up before our explanations are complete.
Religion and legislation can only be respected if they accept free and public examination [Kant]
     Full Idea: Religion and legislation ...excite a just suspicion against themselves, and cannot claim that unfeigned respect that reason grants only to that which has been able to withstand free and public examination.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], A Pref xi n)
     A reaction: A wonderful statement of a core principle of the liberal enlightenment. I can't really relate to anyone who would reject this idea (in general). Legislation might have special circumstances (such as wartime).
All objections are dogmatic (against propositions), or critical (against proofs), or sceptical [Kant]
     Full Idea: All objections are dogmatic, critical or sceptical. A dogmatic objection is directed against a proposition, but a critical one is directed against a proof. ..The sceptical objection puts the proposition and its opposite over against one another as equals.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B406-/A388)
     A reaction: This is a nice distinction, and I would think that the hallmark of a philosophical person is that they are always looking for critical objections, because they want beliefs to be supported by good reasons, not prejudices.
The hallmark of rationality is setting itself an end [Kant]
     Full Idea: Rational nature separates itself out from all other things by the fact that it sets itself an end.
     From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 437.82)
Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce]
     Full Idea: The object of reasoning is to find out, from the consideration of what we already know, something else which we do not know.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p. 7)
     A reaction: I defy anyone to come up with a better definition of reasoning than that. The emphasis is on knowledge rather than truth, which you would expect from a pragmatist. …Actually the definition doesn't cover conditional reasoning terribly well.
I reason in order to avoid disappointment and surprise [Peirce]
     Full Idea: I do not reason for the sake of my delight in reasoning, but solely to avoid disappointment and surprise.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (Criterion of Validity in Reasoning [1903], I)
     A reaction: Hence Peirce places more emphasis on inductive and abductive reasoning than on deductive reasoning. I have to agree with him. Anyone account of why we reason must have an evolutionary framework. What advantage does reason bestow? It concerns the future.
Rather than instrumental reason, Habermas emphasises its communicative role [Habermas, by Oksala]
     Full Idea: Instead of Enlightenment instrumental rationality (criticised by Adorno and Horkheimer), Habermas emphasizes 'communicative rationality', which makes critical discussion and mutual understanding possible.
     From: report of Jürgen Habermas (The Theory of Communicative Action [1981]) by Johanna Oksala - Political Philosophy: all that matters Ch.6
     A reaction: There was a good reason not to smoke cigarettes, before we found out what it is. In one sense, reasons are in the world. This is interesting, but I feel analytic vertigo, as the lovely concept of 'rationality' becomes blurred and diffused.
Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views [Harman]
     Full Idea: Implication is cumulative, in a way that inference may not be. In argument one accumulates conclusions; things are always added, never subtracted. Reasoned revision, however, can subtract from one's view as well as add.
     From: Gilbert Harman (Change in View: Principles of Reasoning [1986], 1)
     A reaction: This has caught Harman's attention, I think (?), because he is looking for non-monotonic reasoning (i.e. revisable reasoning) within a classical framework. If revision is responding to evidence, the logic can remain conventional.
Reasoning might be defined in terms of its functional role, which is to produce knowledge [Harman]
     Full Idea: Reasoning could be treated as a functionally defined process that is partly defined in terms of its role in giving a person knowledge.
     From: Gilbert Harman (Thought [1973], 3.6)
Consensus is the enemy of thought [Badiou]
     Full Idea: Consensus is the enemy of thought.
     From: Alain Badiou (Briefings on Existence [1998], 2)
     A reaction: A nice slogan for bringing Enlightenment optimists to a halt. I am struck. Do I allow my own thinking to always be diverted towards something which might result in a consensus? Do I actually (horror!) prefer consensus to truth?
We prefer reason or poetry according to whether basics are intelligible or not [Roochnik]
     Full Idea: Is the arché (basis) intelligible, or is it chaos? Upon this question hinges all, for answering it determines whether poetry or logos is the form of human speech that best does justice to the world.
     From: David Roochnik (The Tragedy of Reason [1990], p.139)
Good inference has mechanism, precision, scope, simplicity, fertility and background fit [Lipton]
     Full Idea: Among the inferential virtues commonly cited are mechanism, precision, scope, simplicity, fertility or fruitfulness, and fit with background beliefs.
     From: Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'the guiding')
     A reaction: [He cites Hempel, Kuhn, Quine, and Newton-Smith] I take the over-arching term 'coherence' to cover much of this, though a bolder hypothesis offers more than mere coherence.
Good reasoning will avoid contradiction, enhance coherence, not ignore evidence, and maximise evidence [O'Grady]
     Full Idea: The four basic principles of rationality are 1) avoid contradiction, 2) enhance coherence, 3) avoid ignoring evidence, and 4) maximise evidence.
     From: Paul O'Grady (Relativism [2002], Ch.5)
     A reaction: I like this, and can't think of any additions. 'Coherence' is the vaguest of the conditions. Maximising evidence is still the driving force of science, even if it does sound quaintly positivist.
What justifies reliance on reason? Is it just a tool? Why is it better than blind belief? [Sen]
     Full Idea: What is the ultimate justification for relying on reason? Is reason cherished as a good tool, and if so, how does it differ from blind and unquestioning belief?
     From: Amartya Sen (The Idea of Justice [2009], 01 'Critique')
     A reaction: And can it answer the romantic charge of stunting a rich life? NIetzsche started this one, by asking the value of truth. Proposal: treat others rationally, and treat yourself intuitively.