| 2301 | We know by thought that what is done cannot be undone [Descartes] |
| 12553 | Some of our ideas contain relations which we cannot conceive to be absent [Locke] |
| 2112 | Truths of reason are known by analysis, and are necessary; facts are contingent, and their opposites possible [Leibniz] |
| 17079 | Proofs of necessity come from the understanding, where they have their source [Leibniz] |
| 19432 | Intelligible truth is independent of any external things or experiences [Leibniz] |
| 23461 | Kant thought worldly necessities are revealed by what maths needs to make sense [Kant, by Morris,M] |
| 14710 | Necessity is always knowable a priori, and what is known a priori is always necessary [Kant, by Schroeter] |
| 16256 | For Kant metaphysics must be necessary, so a priori, so can't be justified by experience [Kant, by Maudlin] |
| 5524 | Maths must be a priori because it is necessary, and that cannot be derived from experience [Kant] |
| 23495 | The tautologies of logic show the logic of language and the world [Wittgenstein] |
| 9169 | A statement can be metaphysically necessary and epistemologically contingent [Putnam] |
| 15101 | Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker] |
| 4728 | Kripke separates necessary and a priori, proposing necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori examples [Kripke, by O'Grady] |
| 16990 | A priori = Necessary because we imagine all worlds, and we know without looking at actuality? [Kripke] |
| 15228 | Necessity and contingency are separate from the a priori and the a posteriori [Harré/Madden] |
| 2526 | Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity [Dennett] |
| 12428 | Many necessities are inexpressible, and unknowable a priori [Kitcher] |
| 20476 | If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo] |
| 13956 | Kripke is often taken to be challenging a priori insights into necessity [Chalmers] |
| 9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
| 21621 | We can't infer metaphysical necessities to be a priori knowable - or indeed knowable in any way [Williamson] |
| 4719 | Maybe developments in logic and geometry have shown that the a priori may be relative [O'Grady] |