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10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent

[knowing what happens to be, just through thought]

6 ideas
If we understand God and his choices, we have a priori knowledge of contingent truths [Leibniz, by Garber]
     Full Idea: Insofar as we have some insight into how God chooses, we can know a priori the laws of nature that God chooses for this best of all possible worlds. In this way, it is possible to have genuine a priori knowledge of contingent truths.
     From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Conspectus libelli (book outline) [1678], A6.4.1998-9) by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 6
     A reaction: I think it would be doubtful whether our knowledge of God's choosings would count as a priori. How do we discover them? Ah! We derive God from the ontological argument, and his choosings from the divine perfection implied thereby.
Only God sees contingent truths a priori [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Only God sees contingent truths a priori.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Freedom [1689], p.95)
     A reaction: This because everything is interconnected, and the whole picture must be seen to understand a contingent truth.
The meter is defined necessarily, but the stick being one meter long is contingent a priori [Kripke]
     Full Idea: In 'one meter is the length of stick S at t', one designator (one meter) is rigid and the other (length of S at t) is not. 'S is one meter long at t' is contingent, as it could have a different length. In this sense, there are contingent a priori truths.
     From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970], Lecture 1)
     A reaction: [very compressed] Not convincing. He is proposing that a truth is knowable a priori, though knowledge of it is utterly dependent on a ceremony having taken place. It would not be true if that event hadn't taken place, so how can be it be known a priori?
The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth [Kripke]
     Full Idea: If a speaker introduced a designator into a language by a ceremony, then in virtue of his very linguistic act, he would be in a position to say 'I know that Fa', but nevertheless 'Fa' would be a contingent truth (provided F is not an essential property).
     From: Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity preface [1980], p.14)
     A reaction: If someone else does the designation, I seem to have contingent knowledge that the ceremony has taken place. You needn't experience the object, but you must experience the ceremony, even if you perform it.
Knowing our own existence is a priori, but not necessary [Kitcher]
     Full Idea: What is known a priori may not be necessary, if we know a priori that we ourselves exist and are actual.
     From: Philip Kitcher (A Priori Knowledge Revisited [2000], §II)
     A reaction: Compare Idea 12428, which challenges the inverse of this relationship. This one looks equally convincing, and Kripke adds other examples of contingent a priori truths, such as those referring to the metre rule in Paris.
Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so [Mares]
     Full Idea: It seems natural to claim that light rays moving in straight lines is contingent but a priori. Scientists stipulate that they are the standard by which we measure straightness, but their appropriateness for this task is a contingent feature of the world.
     From: Edwin D. Mares (A Priori [2011], 02.9)
     A reaction: This resembles the metre rule in Paris. It is contingent that something is a certain way, so we make being that way a conventional truth, which can therefore be known via the convention, rather than via the contingent fact.