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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts

[there are only closely resembling possible entities]

31 ideas
Leibniz has a counterpart view of de re counterfactuals [Leibniz, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics [Kripke]
The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins [Kripke, by Sider]
The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga]
Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga]
Essence is a transworld heir line, rather than a collection of properties [Kaplan]
Unusual people may have no counterparts, or several [Kaplan]
Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker]
If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker]
If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker]
Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker]
Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis]
Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis]
If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis]
Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis]
The counterpart relation is sortal-relative, so objects need not be a certain way [Lewis, by Merricks]
A counterpart in a possible world is sufficiently similar, and more similar than anything else [Lewis, by Mautner]
Why should statements about what my 'counterpart' could have done interest me? [Mautner on Lewis]
In counterpart theory 'Humphrey' doesn't name one being, but a mereological sum of many beings [Lewis]
Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations [Inwagen]
We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien]
Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity [Forbes,G]
Counterpart relations are neither symmetric nor transitive, so there is no logic of equality for them [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
Counterparts rest on similarity, so there are many such relations in different contexts [Sider]
To decide whether something is a counterpart, we need to specify a relevant sortal concept [Hawley]
If worlds are concrete, objects can't be present in more than one, and can only have counterparts [Read]
If my counterpart is happy, that is irrelevant to whether I 'could' have been happy [Merricks]
If 'Fido is possibly black' depends on Fido's counterparts, then it has no actual truthmaker [Merricks]
De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P]
Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P]
Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P]