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4608
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Minds are hard-wired, or trial-and-error, or experimental, or full self-aware
[Dennett, by Heil]
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Full Idea:
Dennett identifies a hierarchy of minds running from 'Darwinian' (hard-wired solutions to problems), to 'Skinnerian' (trial-and-error), to 'Popperian' (anticipating possible experience), to 'Gregorian' (self-conscious representation, probably linguistic).
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From:
report of Daniel C. Dennett (Kinds of Minds [1996]) by John Heil - Philosophy of Mind Ch.5
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A reaction:
Interesting. The concept of an experiment seems a major step (assessing reality against an internal map), and the ability to think about one's own thoughts certainly strikes me as the mark of a top level mind. Maybe that is the importance of language.
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2994
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In CRTT thought may be represented, content must be
[Fodor]
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Full Idea:
In the Representation Theory of Mind, programs (the 'laws of thought') may be explicitly represented, but data structures (the 'contents of thought') have to be.
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From:
Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p. 25)
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A reaction:
Presumably this is because content is where mental events actually meet up with the reality being considered. It may be an abstract procedure, but if it doesn't plug into reality then it isn't thought, but merely activity, like that of the liver.
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7852
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The only serious mind-brain theories now are identity, token identity, realization and supervenience
[Papineau]
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Full Idea:
Anybody writing seriously about mind-brain issues nowadays needs to explain whether they think of materialism in terms of identity, token identity, realization, or supervenience.
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From:
David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], Intro §6)
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A reaction:
Dualists are not invited. Functionalists are attending a different party. I wonder if his four categories collapse into two: the token/supervenience view, and the identity/realization view?
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4610
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Different generations focus on either the quality of mind, or its scientific standing, or the content of thought
[Heil]
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Full Idea:
One generation addresses the qualitative aspect of mentality, the next focuses on its scientific standing, its successor takes up the problem of mental content, then the cycle starts all over again…
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From:
John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6)
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A reaction:
This pinpoints the three interlinked questions. We seem to be currently obsessed with the quality of experience (the 'Hard Question'), but the biggest questions is how the three aspects fit together. If there are three necessities here, they must coexist.
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2537
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Types are properties, and tokens are events. Are they split between mental and physical, or not?
[Sturgeon]
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Full Idea:
The question is whether mental and physical types (which are properties) are distinct, and whether mental and physical tokens (which are events) are distinct.
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From:
Scott Sturgeon (Matters of Mind [2000], Intro)
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A reaction:
Helpful. While the first one gives us the rather dodgy notion of 'property dualism', the second one seems to imply Cartesian dualism, if the events really are distinct. It seems to me that thought is an aspect of brain events, not a distinct event.
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6617
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The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties?
[Lowe]
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Full Idea:
Philosophy of mind seems to address the questions of whether the mind is distinct from the body, and whether the mind has properties, such as consciousness, which are unique to it.
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From:
E.J. Lowe (Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind [2000], Intro)
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A reaction:
Simple enough, but the modern debate seems to centre on the second question, which is here stated nice and clearly. Of course, wild garlic has a unique smell, but that doesn't quite qualify as a 'unique property'. Are the properties of mind unpredictable?
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