15847 | Two things relate either as same or different, or part of a whole, or the whole of the part [Plato] |
15825 | Carneades denied the transitivity of identity [Carneades, by Chisholm] |
9853 | Identity between objects is not a consequence of identity, but part of what 'identity' means [Frege, by Dummett] |
18440 | Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive [Quine] |
17036 | Identity statements can be contingent if they rely on descriptions [Kripke] |
17038 | If Hesperus and Phosophorus are the same, they can't possibly be different [Kripke] |
9905 | Identity statements make sense only if there are possible individuating conditions [Benacerraf] |
16224 | There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b [Evans, by PG] |
16521 | A is necessarily A, so if B is A, then B is also necessarily A [Wiggins] |
14073 | Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard] |
15969 | Two things can never be identical, so there is no problem [Lewis] |
6047 | All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true [McGinn] |
5494 | 'Lightning is electric discharge' and 'Phosphorus is Venus' are synthetic a posteriori identities [Lycan] |
15074 | We would understand identity between objects, even if their existence was impossible [Fine,K] |
16027 | If two things are equal, each side involves a necessity, so the equality is necessary [Gallois] |
16231 | Occasional Identity: two objects can be identical at one time, and different at others [Gallois, by Hawley] |
14081 | Identities can be true despite indeterminate reference, if true under all interpretations [Schaffer,J] |
16360 | Identity statements are informative if they link separate mental files [Recanati] |
14476 | Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified [Thomasson] |
14477 | Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category [Thomasson] |