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9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity

[relation of identity holding between a thing and itself]

23 ideas
Aristotle denigrates the category of relation, but for modern absolutists self-relation is basic [Benardete,JA on Aristotle]
We can't understand self-identity without a prior grasp of the object [Aristotle]
You are one with yourself in form and matter [Aristotle]
Two things can't occupy one place and time, which leads us to the idea of self-identity [Locke]
Everything is what it is, and not another thing [Butler]
'An object is the same with itself' is meaningless; it expresses unity, not identity [Hume]
Saying an object is the same with itself is only meaningful over a period of time [Hume]
Frege made identity a logical notion, enshrined above all in the formula 'for all x, x=x' [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
Two things can't be identical, and self-identity is an empty concept [Wittgenstein]
The 'property' of self-identity is uselessly tautological [Black]
The property of being identical with me is an individual concept [Chisholm]
A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver]
The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property [Armstrong]
A relation can clearly be reflexive, and identity is the smallest reflexive relation [Kripke]
Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga]
If non-existent things are self-identical, they are just one thing - so call it the 'null object' [Bostock]
Identity is simple - absolutely everything is self-identical, and nothing is identical to another thing [Lewis]
Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical [McGinn]
Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects [McGinn]
Absolutists might accept that to exist is relative, but relative to what? How about relative to itself? [Benardete,JA]
Maybe self-identity isn't existence, if Pegasus can be self-identical but non-existent [Benardete,JA]
Self-identity should have two components, its existence, and its neutral identity with itself [Fine,K]
If Cicero=Tully refers to the man twice, then surely Cicero=Cicero does as well? [Fine,K]