16140
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Secondary substances do have subjects, so they are not ultimate in the ontology
[Aristotle, by Frede,M]
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Full Idea:
The concept of substance applies to secondary substances only with some deletions; ..it is not true that they have no subjects, and hence they are not ultimate subjects for all other elements of the ontology.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Michael Frede - Title, Unity, Authenticity of the 'Categories' V
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A reaction:
It increasingly strikes that to treat secondary substance (roughly, species) as essence is a shocking misreading of Aristotle. Frede says they are substances, because they do indeed 'underlie'.
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10965
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In earlier Aristotle the substances were particulars, not kinds
[Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred]
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Full Idea:
In 'Metaphysics' Aristotle changed his view, as in 'Categories' the substances, the basic realities, were particular items, notably individual men, horses, cabbages etc.
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From:
report of Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE]) by Hugh Lawson-Tancred - Introductions to 'Metaphysics' p.178
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A reaction:
The charge is that having successfully rebelled against Plato, Aristotle gradually succumbed to his teacher's influence, and ended up with a more platonist view. For anti-platonists like myself, the 'Categories' seems to be the key text.
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11036
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A 'primary' substance is in each subject, with species or genera as 'secondary' substances
[Aristotle]
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Full Idea:
A substance, in its most primary sense, is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. the individual man or horse. The species in which things primarily called substances are, are called secondary substances, as are the genera.
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From:
Aristotle (Categories [c.331 BCE], 02a11)
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A reaction:
This distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' substances is characteristic of Aristotle's earlier metaphysical view, with the later view (more unified and Platonic) in the 'Metaphysics'.
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16084
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Is a primary substance a foundation of existence, or the last stage of understanding?
[Aristotle, by Gill,ML]
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Full Idea:
In Categories a primary substance has ontological priority, where other things depend on its existence, ..but in Metaphysics he emphasizes conceptual priority, where the primary is what is understood through itself (a definable unity).
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From:
report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], book) by Mary Louise Gill - Aristotle on Substance Intro
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A reaction:
Interesting for my view of essence as rooted in explanation. It is the Metaphysics version that appeals to me. A metaphysics is constructed from our modes of understanding. 'Concavity' is his example of a primary unity.
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16779
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Cut wood doesn't make a new substance, but seems to make separate subjects
[William of Ockham]
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Full Idea:
When a piece of wood is divided in two halves, no new substance is generated. But there are now two substances, or the accidents of the two halves would be without a subject. They existed before hand, and were one piece of wood, but not in the same place.
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From:
William of Ockham (Seven Quodlibets [1332], IV.19), quoted by Richard S. Westfall - Never at Rest: a biography of Isaac Newton 26.2
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A reaction:
A nice example, demonstrating that there are substances within substances, contrary to the view of Duns Scotus. If a substance is just a subject for properties, it is hard to know what to make of this case.
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16616
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Substances 'substand' (beneath accidents), or 'subsist' (independently)
[Eustachius]
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Full Idea:
It is proper to substance both to stretch out or exist beneath accidents, which is to substand, and to exist per se and not in another, which is to subsist.
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From:
Eustachius a Sancto Paulo (Summa [1609], I.1.3b.1.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 06.2
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A reaction:
This reflects Aristotle wavering between 'ousia' being the whole of a thing, or the substrate of a thing. In current discussion, 'substance' still wavers between a thing which 'is' a substance, and substance being the essence.
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7558
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Substances mirror God or the universe, each from its own viewpoint
[Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
Each substance is like a whole world, and like a mirror of God, or indeed of the whole universe, which each one expresses in its own fashion.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Discourse on Metaphysics [1686]), quoted by Nicholas Jolley - Leibniz Intro
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A reaction:
Leibniz isn't a pantheist, so he does not identify God with the universe, so it is a bit revealing that substance could reflect either one or the other, and he doesn't seem to care which. In the end, for all the sophistication, he just made it up.
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4304
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Descartes says there are two substance, Spinoza one, and Leibniz infinitely many
[Cottingham]
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Full Idea:
Descartes was a dualist about substance, Spinoza was a monist, and Leibniz was a pluralist (an infinity of substances).
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From:
John Cottingham (The Rationalists [1988], p.76)
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A reaction:
Spinoza is appealing. We posit a substance, as the necessary basis for existence, but it is unclear how more than one substance can be differentiated. If mind is a separate substance, why isn't iron? Why aren't numbers?
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13068
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We can ask for the nature of substance, about type of substance, and about individual substances
[Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
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Full Idea:
In the 'blueprint' approach to substance, we confront at least three questions: What is it for a thing to be an individual substance? What is it for a thing to be the kind of substance that it is? What is it to be that very individual substance?
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From:
Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J (Substance and Individuation in Leibniz [1999], 1.1.1)
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A reaction:
My working view is that the answer to the first question is that substance is essence, that the second question is overrated and parasitic on the third, and that the third is the key question, and also reduces to essence.
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