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8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions

[idea of a disposition towards certain behaviour]

25 ideas
In the 17th century, 'disposition' usually just means the spatial arrangement of parts [Boyle, by Pasnau]
     Full Idea: In Locke and Boyle, 'disposition' and its various cognates are standardly used to refer to the corpuscular structure of a body - the spatial arrangement of its parts - without reflecting any commitment to a dispositional property.
     From: report of Robert Boyle (The Origin of Forms and Qualities [1666]) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 23.2
     A reaction: Here as a warning against enthusiasts for dispositional properties misreadigmg 17th century texts to their supposed advantage. Pasnau says none of them believe in dispositional properties or real powers.
Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman]
     Full Idea: Dispositions of a thing are as important to us as overt behaviour, but they strike us by comparison as rather ethereal. So we are moved to enquire whether we can bring them down to earth, and explain disposition terms without reference to occult powers.
     From: Nelson Goodman (Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed) [1954], II.3)
     A reaction: Mumford quotes this at the start of his book on dispositions, as his agenda. I suspect that the 'occult' aspect crept in because dispositions were based on powers, and the dominant view was that these were the immediate work of God.
Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine]
     Full Idea: Once we can legitimize a disposition term by defining the relevant similarity standard, we are apt to know the mechanism of the disposition, and so by-pass the similarity.
     From: Willard Quine (Natural Kinds [1969], p.135)
     A reaction: I love mechanisms, but can we characterise mechanisms without mentioning powers and dispositions? Quine's dream is to eliminate 'similarity'.
Either dispositions rest on structures, or we keep saying 'all things being equal' [Quine]
     Full Idea: The further a disposition is from those that can confidently be pinned on molecular structure or something comparably firm, the more our talk of it tends to depend on a vague factor of 'caeteris paribus'
     From: Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960], §46)
     A reaction: I approve of this. It is precisely the point of scientific essentialism, I take it. We are faced with innumerable uncertain dispositions, but once the underlying mechanisms are known, their role in nature becomes fairly precise.
Dispositions in action can be destroyed, be recovered, or remain unchanged [Martin,CB]
     Full Idea: Three forms of dispositionality are illustrated by explosives (which are destroyed by manifestation), being soluble (where the dispositions is lost but recoverable), and being stable (where the disposition is unchanged).
     From: C.B. Martin (The Mind in Nature [2008], 02.7)
     A reaction: [compressed] Presumably the explosives could be recovered after the explosion, since the original elements are still there, but it would take a while. The retina remains stable by continually changing. There are no simple distinctions!
To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong]
     Full Idea: It is only to the extent that we relate disposition to 'categorical basis', and difference of disposition to difference of 'categorical basis', that we can speak of dispositions. We must be Realists, not Phenomenalists, about dispositions.
     From: David M. Armstrong (A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev) [1968], 6.VI)
     A reaction: It is Armstrong's realism which motivates this claim, because he thinks only categorical properties are real. But categorical properties seem to be passive, and the world is active.
Nearly all fundamental properties of physics are dispositional [Ellis]
     Full Idea: With few, if any, exceptions, the fundamental properties of physical theory are dispositional properties of the things that have them.
     From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.3)
     A reaction: He is denying that they are passive (as Locke saw primary qualities), and says they are actively causal, or else capacities or propensities. Sounds right to me.
The most fundamental properties of nature (mass, charge, spin ...) all seem to be dispositions [Ellis]
     Full Idea: The properties of the most fundamental things in nature, including mass, charge, spin, and the like, would all appear to be dispositional.
     From: Brian Ellis (Scientific Essentialism [2001], 3.05)
     A reaction: This goes with the Leibnizian claim that the most fundamental features of nature must be active in character.
Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker]
     Full Idea: Dispositional properties deserve special mention since they seem to be properties that have modal consequences - consequences for what properties the individuals that instantiate them would have in counterfactual circumstances.
     From: Robert C. Stalnaker (Mere Possibilities [2012], 3.4)
     A reaction: I take this to be the key idea in trying to understand modality, but Stalnaker makes this point and then moves swiftly on, because it is so far away from his possible worlds models, in which he has invested a lifetime.
We can bring dispositions into existence, as in creating an identifier [Dennett, by Mumford]
     Full Idea: We can bring a real disposition into existence, as in Dennett's case of a piece of cardboard torn in half, so that two strangers can infallibly identify one another.
     From: report of Daniel C. Dennett (Consciousness Explained [1991], p.376) by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 03.7 n37
     A reaction: Presumably human artefacts in general qualify as sets of dispositions which we have created.
Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world [Molnar]
     Full Idea: Dispositions can be causes. What is not actual cannot be a cause or any part of a cause. Merely possible events are not actual, and that makes them causally impotent. The claim that powers are causally potent has strong initial plausibility.
     From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 5)
     A reaction: [He credits Mellor 1974 for this idea] He will need to show how dispositions can be causes (other than, presumably, being anticipated or imagined by conscious minds), which he says he will do in Ch. 12.
Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added? [Heil]
     Full Idea: There is a dispute over whether a property's dispositionality is built into the property or whether it is a contingent add-on.
     From: John Heil (From an Ontological Point of View [2003], 09.4)
     A reaction: Put that way, the idea that it is built in seems much more plausible. If it is an add-on, an explanation of why that disposition is added to that particular property seems required. If it is built in, it seems legitimate to accept it as a brute fact.
Dispositions are ascribed to at least objects, substances and persons [Mumford]
     Full Idea: Dispositions are ascribed to at least three distinguishable classes of things: objects, substances, and persons.
     From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 01.1)
     A reaction: Are dispositions not also ascribed to properties? Magnetism has a disposition to attract iron filings?
Dispositions can be contrasted either with occurrences, or with categorical properties [Mumford]
     Full Idea: For some the notion of a disposition is contrasted with the notion of an occurrence; for others, it is contrasted with that of a categorical property.
     From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 01.6)
     A reaction: I vote for dispositions over the other two, but I take the categorical properties to be the main rival.
Unlike categorical bases, dispositions necessarily occupy a particular causal role [Mumford]
     Full Idea: The idea of a disposition occupying a different causal role involves a conceptual confusion, ...but there is no conceptual or logical absurdity in a categorical base occupying a different causal role.
     From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 07.3)
     A reaction: This is the core of Mumford's theory of dispositions. I'm beginning to think that dispositions are merely ways we have of describing and labelling functional mechanisms, and so 'dispositions' drop out of the final story.
Dispositionality is a natural selection function, picking outcomes from the range of possibilities [Mumford/Anjum]
     Full Idea: Dispositionality can be understood as a sort of selection function - a natural one in this case - and picks out a limited number of outcomes from all the ones that the disposition is for.
     From: S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum (Getting Causes from Powers [2011], 8.9)
     A reaction: Functions should strictly have one output. This sounds wrong. The disposition pushes its powers into the environment, but it is the surrounding contextual powers which do the selecting, in concert. No disposition does any selecting
Instead of adding Aristotelian forms to physical stuff, one could add dispositions [Pasnau]
     Full Idea: Someone who wants to enrich a strict corpuscularian account with other metaphysical entities has alternatives other than Aristotelian hylomorphism. One can, for instance, introduce dispositions.
     From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 28.2)
     A reaction: This slightly throws me, because I have been flirting with a dispositional account of hylomorphism. The implication is that the form is abstract and structural, where the disposition is real and physical. But dispositions can do the job of forms.
I have an 'iterated ability' to learn the violin - that is, the ability to acquire that ability [Vetter]
     Full Idea: I do not have the ability to play the violin. Nor does my desk. Unlike my desk, however, I possess the ability to learn to play the violin - the ability, that is, to acquire the ability to play the violin. I have an 'iterated ability' to play the violin.
     From: Barbara Vetter (Potentiality [2015], 4.6)
     A reaction: An important idea, though the examples are more likely to come from human behaviour than from the non-human physical world.
Dispositions have directed behaviour which occurs if triggered [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
     Full Idea: The three platitudes about dispositions are that 1) they are directed towards some specific behaviour, 2) they can be triggered under specific conditions, and 3) their directedness is modal, meaning not 'when it is triggered' but 'it it were triggered'.
     From: Friend/Kimpton-Nye (Dispositions and Powers [2023], 2.1.1)
     A reaction: [PG summary] This is the preliminary to an attempt at a precise formal analysis, covering a number of hypothetical problem cases. 3) is the counterfactual rather than material conditional. Seems accurate.
'Masked' dispositions fail to react because something intervenes [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
     Full Idea: A disposition is 'masked' when it fails to manifest due to interference, such as a fragile vase packed in bubble wrap, or an antidote taken after some poison.
     From: Friend/Kimpton-Nye (Dispositions and Powers [2023], 2.2.1)
     A reaction: [compressed] The easiest account of these would be to say that the stimulus or trigger of the disposition never completely occurs. Poisons are only disposed to kill when they are fully ingested. Bubble wrapped vases can't be properly struck.
A disposition is 'altered' when the stimulus reverses the disposition [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
     Full Idea: A disposition is subject to 'altering' when the stimulus of the disposition influences whether (and to what degree) an object has that disposition. Either a live wire goes dead when it is touched, or a dead wire has a sensor making it live when touched.
     From: Friend/Kimpton-Nye (Dispositions and Powers [2023], 2.2.2)
     A reaction: The word 'fink' is used of such interference. Not much of a problem, I would say, because at the moment when the stimulus comes to do its job, there is no longer a disposition for it to trigger. No different from switching off a light.
A disposition is 'mimicked' if a different cause produces that effect from that stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
     Full Idea: A disposition is 'mimicked' by objects without that disposition which behave as though they do have it. Styrofoam plates are not fragile, but make a horrible sound when stressed, causing some annoyed person to break them.
     From: Friend/Kimpton-Nye (Dispositions and Powers [2023], 2.2.3)
     A reaction: A rather strained example! It shouldn't be a problem if the same cause (stress) leads to the same effect (breaking), but by a different path which is not the same as fragility. A formal analysis must obviously cover this case.
A 'trick' can look like a stimulus for a disposition which will happen without it [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
     Full Idea: A 'trick' can behave like a disposition, as when someone says 'abracadabra' over a hot cup of coffee, stimulating it (?) to gradually cool down.
     From: Friend/Kimpton-Nye (Dispositions and Powers [2023], 2.2.4)
     A reaction: This is like Humean constant conjunction which is obviously not a cause, such as night following day. Only a problem is this cup of coffee is seen in isolation from all other cups of coffee. Post hoc propter hoc does not apply to all stimuli!
Some dispositions manifest themselves without a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
     Full Idea: Some dispositions, such as loquaciousness or irascibility, are disposed to manifest whether they are provoked to do so.
     From: Friend/Kimpton-Nye (Dispositions and Powers [2023], 2.3.3)
     A reaction: We might surmise that such people have internal triggers that get them going, rather than overt ones. The Sun has a disposition to shine, without an external stimulus. The theory of powers says nature is active, rather than being disposed to activity.
We could analyse dispositions as 'possibilities', with no mention of a stimulus [Friend/Kimpton-Nye]
     Full Idea: We might abandon the relational analysis of dispositions (as stimulus-effect), and just say a disposition is a 'possibility', which simply can manifest, however that manifestation comes about.
     From: Friend/Kimpton-Nye (Dispositions and Powers [2023], 2.3.5)
     A reaction: [Compressed. He particularly cites Barbara Vetter] A mere 'possibility' seems to cover passive states as well as potentially active ones. A cushion can be dented, but I wouldn't say it was 'disposed' to dent. Radioactive decay is a disposition, though.