10071 | Second Incompleteness: nice theories can't prove their own consistency [Smith,P on Gödel] |
13341 | Using the definition of truth, we can prove theories consistent within sound logics [Tarski] |
13540 | A set of formulae is 'inconsistent' when there is no interpretation which can make them all true [Bostock] |
13542 | A proof-system is 'absolutely consistent' iff we don't have |-(S)φ for every formula [Bostock] |
13541 | For 'negation-consistent', there is never |-(S)φ and |-(S)¬φ [Bostock] |
12656 | P-and-Q gets its truth from the truth of P and truth of Q, but consistency isn't like that [Fodor] |
9552 | Sentences are consistent if they can all be true; for Frege it is that no contradiction can be deduced [Chihara] |
18785 | Consistency is semantic, but non-contradiction is syntactic [Mares] |
10119 | Consistency is a purely syntactic property, unlike the semantic property of soundness [George/Velleman] |
10126 | A 'consistent' theory cannot contain both a sentence and its negation [George/Velleman] |