13335 | Semantics is the concepts of connections of language to reality, such as denotation, definition and truth [Tarski] |
13336 | A language containing its own semantics is inconsistent - but we can use a second language [Tarski] |
18756 | Tarski built a compositional semantics for predicate logic, from dependent satisfactions [Tarski, by McGee] |
19313 | Tarksi invented the first semantics for predicate logic, using this conception of truth [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
19059 | In standard views you could replace 'true' and 'false' with mere 0 and 1 [Dummett] |
19062 | Classical two-valued semantics implies that meaning is grasped through truth-conditions [Dummett] |
19063 | Beth trees show semantics for intuitionistic logic, in terms of how truth has been established [Dummett] |
3810 | In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle] |
13364 | Interpretation by assigning objects to names, or assigning them to variables first [Bostock, by PG] |
10284 | There are three different standard presentations of semantics [Hodges,W] |
10283 | A formula needs an 'interpretation' of its constants, and a 'valuation' of its variables [Hodges,W] |
10285 | I |= φ means that the formula φ is true in the interpretation I [Hodges,W] |
10016 | When an 'interpretation' creates a model based on truth, this doesn't include Fregean 'sense' [Hodes] |
10570 | Assigning an entity to each predicate in semantics is largely a technical convenience [Fine,K] |
6653 | Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth [Lowe] |
10898 | The semantics shows how truth values depend on instantiations of properties and relations [Zalabardo] |
10902 | We can do semantics by looking at given propositions, or by building new ones [Zalabardo] |
13697 | Valuations in PC assign truth values to formulas relative to variable assignments [Sider] |
18792 | Situation semantics for logics: not possible worlds, but information in situations [Mares] |
18753 | An ontologically secure semantics for predicate calculus relies on sets [McGee] |
15349 | It is easier to imagine truth-value gaps (for the Liar, say) than for truth-value gluts (both T and F) [Horsten] |