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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause

[naming 'the' cause among the pre-condtions of events]

14 ideas
Causes and conditions are not distinct, because we select capriciously from among them [Mill]
     Full Idea: Nothing can better show the absence of any scientific ground for the distinction between the cause of a phenomena and its conditions, than the capricious manner in which we select from among the conditions that which we choose to denominate the cause.
     From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843]), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 2.2
     A reaction: [ref Mill p.196, 1846 edn] Schaffer gives this as the main argument for the 'no-basis' view of the selection of what causes an event. The usual thought is that it is entirely our immediate interests which make us select THE cause. Not convinced.
The strict cause is the total positive and negative conditions which ensure the consequent [Mill]
     Full Idea: The cause, philosophically speaking, is the sum total of the conditions, positive and negative taken together; the whole of the contigencies of every description, which being realized, the consequent invariably follows.
     From: John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843], 3.05.3)
     A reaction: This somewhat notorious remark is not going to be much help in a law court or a laboratory. It is that view which says that the Big Bang must be included in every causal list ever compiled. Well, yes...
Understanding by means of causes is useless if they are not reduced to a minimum number [James]
     Full Idea: The knowledge of things by their causes, which is often given as a definition of rational knowledge, is useless unless the causes converge to a minimum number, while still producing the maximum number of effects.
     From: William James (The Sentiment of Rationality [1882], p.21)
     A reaction: This is certainly the psychological motivation for trying to identify 'the' cause of something, but James always tries to sell such things as subjective. 'Useless' to one person is a subjective criterion; useless to anyone is much more objective.
A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse]
     Full Idea: The cause of the particular change K was such particular change C as alone occurred in the immediate environment of K immediately before.
     From: Curt Ducasse (Nature and Observability of Causal Relations [1926], §3)
     A reaction: The obvious immediately difficulty would be overdetermination, as when it rains while I am watering my garden. The other problem would coincidence, as when I clap my hands just before a bomb goes off.
An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam]
     Full Idea: Imagine a Venusian lands on Earth and observes a forest fire, and says 'I know what caused that - the atmosphere is saturated with oxygen!'. Thus one man's 'background condition' can easily be another man's 'cause'.
     From: Hilary Putnam (Why there isn't a ready-made world [1981], 'Causation')
     A reaction: You can't sweep 'the' cause of a fire away so easily. There is always oxygen on Earth, but only occasional forest fires. The oxygen doesn't 'trigger' the fire (i.e. it isn't the proximate cause).
A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie]
     Full Idea: If a short-circuit causes a fire, the so-called cause is, and is known to be, an Insufficient but Necessary part of a condition which is itself Unnecessary but Sufficient for the result. Let us call this an INUS condition.
     From: J.L. Mackie (Causes and Conditions [1965], §1)
     A reaction: I'm not clear why it is necessary, given that the fire could have started without the short-circuit. The final situation must certainly be sufficient. If only one situation can cause an effect, then the whole situation is necessary.
The cause (or part of it) is what stimulates or releases the powerful particular thing involved [Harré/Madden]
     Full Idea: We can unambiguously differentiate the cause from the effect in that whatever stimulates or releases the action of the powerful particular involved in the causal production is the cause or part of the cause of that effect.
     From: Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV)
     A reaction: I have doubts about distinguishing stimulus from release, and they sensibly don't say they have a test for 'the' cause, but I roughly agree with this idea. I take 'the' cause to also be tied in with explanation.
Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis]
     Full Idea: There is no one right way - though there may be more or less natural ways - of carving up a causal history.
     From: David Lewis (Causal Explanation [1986], I)
     A reaction: This invites a distinction between the 'natural' causes and the 'real' causes. Presumably if any causes were 'real', they would have a better claim to be 'right'. Is an earthquake the 'real' (correct?) cause of a tsunami?
We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis]
     Full Idea: Disagreement about 'the' cause is only disagreement about which part of the causal history is most salient for the purposes of some particular inquiry.
     From: David Lewis (Causal Explanation [1986], I)
     A reaction: I don't believe this. In the majority of cases I see the cause of an event, without having any interest in any particular enquiry. It is just so obvious that there isn't even a disagreement. Maybe there is only one sensible enquiry.
It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis]
     Full Idea: We sometimes single out one among all the causes of some event and call it 'the' cause. ..We may select the abnormal causes, or those under human control, or those we deem good or bad, or those we want to talk about. This is invidious discrimination.
     From: David Lewis (Causation [1973])
     A reaction: This is the standard view expressed by Mill - presumably the obvious empiricist line. But if we specify 'the pre-conditions' for an event, we can't just mention ANY fact prior to the effect - there is obvious relevance. So why not for 'the' cause as well?
The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis]
     Full Idea: In present-day regularity analyses, a cause is defined (roughly) as any member of any minimal set of actual conditions that are jointly sufficient, given the laws, for the existence of the effect.
     From: David Lewis (Causation [1973], p.193)
     A reaction: This is the view Lewis is about to reject. It seem to summarise the essence of the Mackie INUS theory. This account would make the presence of oxygen a cause of almost every human event.
Our selection of 'the' cause is very predictable, so must have a basis [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: The main argument against saying that there is no basis for selecting the one cause of an event is that our selections are too predictable to be without a basis.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.3)
     A reaction: The problem is that we CAN, if we wish, whimsically pick out any pre-condition of an event for discussion (e.g. the railways before WW1). I would say that sensitivity to nature leads us to a moderately correct selection of 'the' cause.
Selecting 'the' cause must have a basis; there is no causation without such a selection [Schaffer,J]
     Full Idea: Another argument against the view that there is no basis for selecting 'the' cause is that we have no concept of causation without such a selection.
     From: Jonathan Schaffer (The Metaphysics of Causation [2007], 2.3)
     A reaction: Good. Otherwise we could only state the conditions preceding an event, and then every event that occurred at any given moment in a region would have the same cause. How can 'the' cause be necessary, and yet capricious?
Privileging one cause is just an epistemic or pragmatic matter, not an ontological one [Mumford/Anjum]
     Full Idea: To speak of 'the' causal explanation privileges some causal powers, but it is implausible that this has a special metaphysical status. Instead, that status should be understood in epistemic or pragmatic terms.
     From: S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum (Getting Causes from Powers [2011], 6.2)
     A reaction: I suppose so, but I see a distinction between actions of powers which only explain that one event (striking the match), and actions of powers which explain a whole family of surrounding events (presence of oxygen).