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5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential

[names do no more than pick out an object]

20 ideas
Anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing [Plato]
Proper names are just labels for persons or objects, and the meaning is the object [Lycan on Mill]
Mill says names have denotation but not connotation [Kripke on Mill]
The meaning of a proper name is the designated object [Frege]
The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions. [Grayling on Russell]
The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Soames on Russell]
Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Bach on Russell]
A name is primitive, and its meaning is the object [Wittgenstein]
A name denotes an object if the object satisfies a particular sentential function [Tarski]
The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke]
Proper names must have referents, because they are not descriptive [Sainsbury on Kripke]
Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism [Szabó on Kripke]
A name's reference is not fixed by any marks or properties of the referent [Kripke]
A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke]
The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans]
To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker]
Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach]
Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators [Jubien]
If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names [Miller,A]
Millians say a name just means its object [Sawyer]