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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism

[proposal that possible worlds really exist]

13 ideas
It is pointless to say possible worlds are truthmakers, and then deny that possible worlds exist [Martin,CB]
Possible worlds realism is only needed to give truth conditions for modals and conditionals [Ellis]
If possible worlds have no structure (S5) they are equal, and it is hard to deny them reality [Dummett]
For Lewis there is no real possibility, since all possibilities are actual [Oderberg on Lewis]
Lewis posits possible worlds just as Quine says that physics needs numbers and sets [Lewis]
If possible worlds really exist, then they are part of actuality [Sider on Lewis]
A world is a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated things [Lewis]
For me, all worlds are equal, with each being actual relative to itself [Lewis]
Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them [Forbes,G]
The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects [Forbes,G]
You can't embrace the formal apparatus of possible worlds, but reject the ontology [Heil]
How can modal Platonists know the truth of a modal proposition? [Read]
Concrete worlds, unlike fictions, at least offer evidence of how the actual world could be [Jacobs]