| 11873 | Our notions may be formed from concepts, but concepts are formed from things [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: You assert that the notion of substance is formed from concepts, and not from things. But are not concepts themselves formed from things? | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Burcher De Volder [1706], 1699.06.23), quoted by David Wiggins - Sameness and Substance Renewed 5.7 | |
| A reaction: A nice remark, which is true even of highly abstruse, abstract or fanciful concepts. You are still left with the question of how far away from reality you have moved when you construct things from your reality-based concepts. |
| 12618 | It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Nothing in any mental life could be the concept CAT unless it is satisfied by cats. If you haven't got a concept that applies to cats, that entails that you haven't got the CAT concept. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (Concepts:where cogn.science went wrong [1998], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: Of course, having a concept that applies to cats doesn't entail that you have the CAT concept. Quine's 'gavagai', for example. I think Fodor is right in this idea. |
| 12635 | Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Pragmatism about concepts really is dead, and the only alternative about concept possession is Cartesianism. That is, it's the thesis that having concept C is being able to think about Cs (as such). | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.2.2) | |
| A reaction: I like this. It is very hard to pick out from Fodor the bits where he is clearly right, but this seems to be one of them. I don't like the pragmatic or Wittgensteinian line that having concepts is all about abilities and uses (like sorting or inferring). |
| 12652 | Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: We think in file names, and file names are Janus-faced: one face turned towards thinking and the other face turned towards what is thought about. I do think that is rather satisfactory. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (LOT 2 [2008], Ch.3 App) | |
| A reaction: So do I. I do hope the philosophical community take up this idea (which they probably won't, simply because Fodor is in the late stages of his career!). |
| 11127 | If concepts just are mental representations, what of concepts we may never acquire? [Peacocke] |
| Full Idea: We might say that the concept just is the mental representation, ...but there are concepts that human beings may never acquire. ...But if concepts are individuated by their possession conditions this will not be a problem. | |
| From: Christopher Peacocke (Rationale and Maxims in Study of Concepts [2005], p.169), quoted by E Margolis/S Laurence - Concepts 1.3 | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure that I understand the notion of a concept we (or any other creature) may never acquire. They no more seem to exist than buildings that were never even designed. |
| 15686 | Labels may indicate categories which embody an essence [Gelman] |
| Full Idea: Labels may signal categories that are believed to embody an essence. | |
| From: Susan A. Gelman (The Essential Child [2003], 02 'Privileged') | |
| A reaction: This is quoted by her, as a summary of a substantial body of research which she endorses. I cite it because it pinpoints my own view. I take 'labels' to be basic to minds, as organisers of thought, and this ties essences to labels. Satisfying picture. |
| 11122 | A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence] |
| Full Idea: It may be possible to have propositional attitudes without having the mental representations tokened in one's head. ...We may say a chess-playing computer thinks it should develop its queen early, though we know it has no representation with that content. | |
| From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 1.1) | |
| A reaction: [Thye cite Dennett - who talks of the 'intentional stance'] It is, of course, a moot point whether we would attribute a propositional attitude (such as belief) to a machine once we knew that it wasn't representing the relevant concepts. |
| 11124 | Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence] |
| Full Idea: A standard criticism is that the mental representation view of concepts creates just another item whose significance bears explaining. Either we have a vicious regress, or we might as well explain external language directly. | |
| From: E Margolis/S Laurence (Concepts [2009], 1.2) | |
| A reaction: [They cite Dummett, with Wittgenstein in the background] I don't agree, because I think that explanation of concepts only stops when it dovetails into biology. |