| 9839 | Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
| 8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
| 9190 | A concept is a function mapping objects onto truth-values, if they fall under the concept [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 13665 | Frege took the study of concepts to be part of logic [Frege, by Shapiro] |
| 13878 | Concepts are, precisely, the references of predicates [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 7736 | A concept is a non-psychological one-place function asserting something of an object [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 17430 | Fregean concepts have precise boundaries and universal applicability [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 8622 | Psychological accounts of concepts are subjective, and ultimately destroy truth [Frege] |
| 18752 | 'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object [Frege, by McGee] |
| 19168 | Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects [Dummett, by Davidson] |
| 11836 | We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense [Wiggins] |
| 12637 | Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor] |
| 12638 | If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor] |
| 12639 | Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor] |
| 12605 | A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke] |
| 12607 | Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke] |
| 13475 | The Fregean concept of GREEN is a function assigning true to green things, and false to the rest [Hart,WD] |
| 22290 | The phrase 'the concept "horse"' can't refer to a concept, because it is saturated [Potter] |